Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Jennifer Chapman, by and through her guardian,
Teresa Chapman, Robert Chapman, and Teresa
Chapman, individually v. Primary Children's
Hospital, a hospital organized to do buisness i the
State of Utah, et al. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kathryn Collard, P. Richard Meyer, Robert N. Williams; Attorneys for Appellants.
Gary B. Ferguson; Richards Brandt; Lloyd B. Poelman; Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell; Attorneys
for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Chapman v. Primary Children\'s Hospital, No. 860230.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1122

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

uw-Sfiff
UT^^Et4l

L\T THE SUPREME COURT OF THE SI Af* OF UTAH
T

T

T

1*

1

*T

" f ' E K S f f i ^ CHAPMAN, by and
*
through her guardian, TERESA
CrLAPMA< I, ROBERT CHAPMAN
*
and TERES/* CHAPMAN individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL,
a hospital organized to do
business in the State of Utah,
et al.,

*

Appeal No. 860230

*
*

Defendants-Respondents.
* * *

*

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

1*

t*

1>

*l*

Appeal From The Judgment Of The Third Judicial District Coart
Oi Salt Lake County, Stat, of Utah
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson I, presiding.
tiAIft B FERGUSON
RICHARDS, BRANDT, ET AL
CSB Tower, Suite 700
JO South Main Sir. cc
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UUh 8-1110

KATHRY

LL« *»YD B. POELMAN
'URTCN, McCONKIE & h\ JSHNfT I ,
330 South 3<00 East
Sal: Lake City, Uu'. 84111

P I U C H A R T MEYEft
R, -BERT N WIIJ JAMS
P. O. Bo> 2J08
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
(307) 733-8300

-A-tto"n3ys for Respondents

Attorneys fbr

4C0LLARD
401 B^s\on Brilding
N n e E\( hanW solace
S Jt U k * q t y , Utah S H U
T ;lephoi z: 'VS01) ^ 4-166-1

Appellants

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
^r

^r

^h

^r

^P

^r

^P

^F

JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and
*
through her guardian, TERESA
CHAPMAN, ROBERT CHAPMAN
*
and TERESA CHAPMAN individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL,
a hospital organized to do
business in the State of Utah,
et al.,

*

Appeal No. 860230

*

Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF
*

*

*

*

Appeal From The Judgment Of The Third Judicial District
Of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.
GARY B.FERGUSON
RICHARDS, BRANDT, ET AL
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

KATHRYN OOLLARD
401 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake C^ty, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1664

LLOYD B.POELMAN
KBRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

P. RICHARD MEYER
ROBERT N. WILLIAMS
P. O. Box 26:08
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
(307) 733-^300

Attorneys for Respondents

Attorneys for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

IDENTITY OF PARTIES

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARYOFTHE ARGUMENT

. ....

8

ARGUMENT

10

I. PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED
BY § 78-14-4 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS)

10

H. PLAINTIFFS PLED FRAUD WITH SUFFICIENT
PARTICULARITY TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE 9(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

20

III. THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
,

22

CONCLUSION

42

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

45

APPENDDC

,

i

A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

Montana Constitution. Article I,
Section 16

27

Texas Constitution. Article I,
Section 13

36

United States Constitution.
Amendment XIV

27

Utah Constitution. Article I,
Section 2 & 24

27, 33

Utah Constitution. Article I,
Section 11

27, 35, 36, 40, 41

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Page
Utah Code, Ann., Section 78-15-1

41

Utah Code, Ann., Section 63-50-13
Utah Code, Ann., Section 15-2-1

23
24

Utah Code, Ann., Section 78-14-4

14, 22, 26, 31,
32, 35, 38, 40

Utah Code, Ann., Section 78-12-36(1)

22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 28, 29, 31

Utah Code, Ann., Section 78-14-2

28, 29, 32

Utah Code, Ann., Section 78-36-12(1)

40

URCP, Rule 8(c)

10

URCP, Rule 9(b)

21

ii

Arizona Rev. Stat., Ann., Section 12-564(D)

39

Arizona Rev. Stat., Ann., Section 12-502

39

CASES
Page
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care
635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981)

32, 34

Ameson v. Olson
270 N.W. 2d 125 (N.D. 1978)

30, 31

Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital for Magma Copper Co.
692 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1983)
39, 40
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)

41, 42

Bixler v. Bowman
94 Wash. 2d 146, 614 P.2d 1290 (1980)

13

Boucher v. Sayeed
459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) .

31

Bowman v. McPheeters
176 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1947)

19

Ealy v. Sheppeck
100 N.M. 250, 669 P.2d 259 (1983)

\

.13

Elder v. Clawson
384 P2d 802 (Utah 1963)

21

Emmett v. Easter Dispensary & Casualty Hospital
130 App. D.C. 50, 396 F2d 931 (D. C. Cir. 1967).

19

Foil v. Ballinger
601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)

15, 37

Gallegos v. Midvale City
27 Utah 2d. 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972)
iii

25

CASES
Page
Garland v. True Temper Corporation
354 F.Supp. 328, 330 (D.C.W.Va.1973)

10

Grazor v. Osborne
57 Tenn. App. 10, 414 S.W. 2d 118 (1966)

13

Groedal v. Westrate
171 Mich. 92, 137 N.W. 87 (1912)

19

Greenhalgh v. Payson City
530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975)

25

Hargett v. Limberg
598 F.Supp. 152 (D.C. Utah 1984)

15

Hotelling v. Walther
169 Or. 559, 130 P2d 944 (Ore. 1942)

13

Kenyon v. Hammer
688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984)

27, 39

Lakeman v. La France
102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (N. H. 1960)
Malan v. Lewis
693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984)

19
26, 31, 32, 34

Myers v. McDonald
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981)

36

Peteler v. Robison
17 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah 1932)

13

Proctor v. Schombert
63 So. 2d 68 (Ha. 1953)

19

Rampton v. Barlow
23 U.2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 383 (1970)

iv

26, 27

CASES
Page
Ray v, Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co.
D170 Okl. 414, 40 P.2d 663 (1953)

10

Rice v. Granite School District
456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969)

18

Rodriguez v. Monoil
9 Ariz. App. 225, 450 P2d 737 (Ariz. 1969) . .

19

Samuel son v. Freeman
454 P.2d 406 (Wash. 1969)

13

Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital
132 Cal. Rptr. 657, 553 P.2d 1129 (1976)

13

Savannah Bank & Trust Co.. v. Meldrim
195 Ga. 765, 25 S.E.2d 567 (1943)

10

Sax v. Votteler
648 S.W. 2d 661 (Tex. 1983)

36, 40

Scott v. School Board of Granite School District
568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977)

22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 37, 40

Schmit v. Esser
183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931)

13

Smith v. Los Angeles
198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984)

20

Stafford v. Shultz
270 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1954)

..

19

Switzer v. Reynolds
606 P.2d 244, 248-49 (Utah 1980)

38

Wahl v. Cunningham
320 Mo. 57, 6 S.W.2d 576 (1928)

10

v

CASES
Page
White v. State
661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983)

27

Wilson v. Iseminger
185 U. S. 55 (1902)

42
OTHER

61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians and Surgeons. Etc.. Section 320

13

51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions. Section 28

42

vi

IDENTITY OF PARTIES
Appellants:

Jennifer Chapman (minor)
Teresa Chapman
Robert Chapman.

Respondents:

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a hospital
organized to do business in the State of Utah;
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a hospital
organized to do business in the State of Utah;
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation
dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL;
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation dba
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL;
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS.
By order entered April 1, 1986, The District Court
redesignated the name of all of the above
Respondents as "I. H. C. Hospitals, Inc., a Utah
Corporation dba Primary Children's Medical Center,"
(R. at 283, infra at A-2.)
GARTH MEYERS, M. D.;
L. GEORGE VEASY, M. D., KAREN BOWMAN, R. N.

OTHER PARTY DEFENDANTS NOT INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY, A Utah corporation;
THE HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign corporation;
JOHN DOE I-X; and
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V.
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Is the medical malpractice statute of limitations Utah Code
Ann. §78-14-4, tolled during a continuing fiduciary relationship
between a patient and a health care provider.
2. Was it error for the trial court to grant summary judgment
based upon the medical malpractice statute of limitations where
there was a material issue of fact as to whether the plaintiffsappellants (hereinafter sometimes "plaintiffs") were aware of the
plaintiffs1 "legal injury" within the period of the statute of limitations.
3. Was it error for the trial court to grant summary judgment
where there was evidence that the defendants-appellees (hereinafter
sometimes "defendants") concealed and misrepresented the cause of
plaintiffs injuries and where, by reason of such conduct, the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants were estopped from utilizing the statute
of limitations as a defense.
4.
Does the Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations
U.C.A. §78-14-4 violate equal protection and due process provisions
of the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.
5. Does the Utah medical malpractice statute of limitations
U.C.A. §78-14-4 unconstitutionally deprive minor plaintiffs of access
to the courts in violation of the Utah Constitution and the Constitution
of the United States.
6. Was it reversible error for the trial court to deny all
discovery rights to the plaintiffs prior to the summary judgment
hearing and decision.
7. Was it reversible error for the trial court to grant
defendant's motions for summary judgment when it was alleged that
care giving rise to the plaintiffs claims had been rendered within the
period of the statute of limitations.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASti
Appellants seek review of a ruling from the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge Wilkinson presiding, which
granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment and motions to
dismiss based upon the statute of limitations in a medical
malpractice action.

(R. at 282-284, infra at A-2 through A-3) The

presentation of arguments herein has been made considerably more
difficult since the Court's order granting summary judgment did not
make any specific rulings with respect to the nuanv issues raised in
this complex case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant, Jennifer Chapman, (hereinafter

sometimes

"plaintiff) claims that she suffers from permanent and irreversible
brain damage due to the negligence of the Defendants Primary
Children's Hospital, Primary Children's Medical Center, Intermountain
Health Care, IHC Hospitals, Inc., and The Health Services Corporation
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (hereinafter
sometimes collectively the "Hospital").

It is further claimed that she

received substandard care thereafter from Drs. Veasy and Meyers
(hereinafter sometimes the "Defendant Physicians") and the Hospital,
who continued to provide what is alleged to be substandard medical
care for Jennifer for several years after she received her brain
injury.

Plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants falsely

misrepresented the cause of Jennifer's brain damage to them.
Plaintiffs submitted interrogatories to defendants and noticed
the depositions of some of the defendants and their employees prior
3

to the Court's hearing upon the defendants motions, but the Court
entered an order staying all of the plaintiffs1 discovery and granted
the motions of defendants for summary judgment before any
discovery could be conducted.

The following facts, are therefore

gleaned from the affidavits of Jennifer Chapman's parents, Teresa
and Robert Chapman which were filed in opposition to defendant's
motions below.

(R. 140-151, infra.

A-5 through A-16)

Jennifer Chapman is now 13 years old and is severely brain
damaged.

She is permanently disabled, completely incompetent and

wholly dependent upon others for all of her bodily functions.
During the first five months of her life, Jennifer experienced
several "blue spells" for which she was taken to a hospital in Ogden,
Utah for treatment.

The doctors who had been treating her in Ogden

then sent her to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for
specialized care.

He diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which

he attempted to stabilize with medication until an operation could be
performed. An operation was subsequently performed to install a
device called a Waterston shunt.

The first shunt did not function

properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was
performed to alter the shunt.

After surgery Jennifer recovered from

the anesthesia and her family was permitted to visit with her.

They

observed that she was crying and awake, spent some time with her
and left the room.

After 10 to 15 minutes had passed, her mother

returned to visit her again and found that a heart monitor machine
attached to Jennifer had gone off and was sounding an alarm.

The

nurses in attendance told Mrs. Chapman that the alarm was caused
by difficulties with the machine.

Mrs. Chapman accepted this
4
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The Chapmans consulted with Defendant Veasy for his
professional opinion as to whether the Ogden doctors had been
negligent in failing to send Jennifer to him sooner.

Dr. Veasy

persuaded the plaintiffs that there had been no negligence on the
part of the Ogden doctors, that Jennifer's brain damage was due to
blood clots, and that it was unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's
misconduct.

Dr. Veasy recommended dismissal of the suit and

Plaintiffs, in reliance of Dr. Veasy's statements to them, dismissed the
suit against the Ogden physicians.
After the dismissal of the Ogden case, the defendants continued
to provide treatment to Jennifer Chapman and continued to
represent to her parents that the medical records and tests showed
that the cause of the injuries was blood clots and that Jennifer's brain
damage was unavoidable.

The Chapmans trusted and believed the

defendants until the summer of 1984, when they for the first time
were given the medical records which related to Jennifer's injuries.
Contrary to the statements of the defendants, the medical records did
not contain any test results which would indicate the true cause of
the injuries and the records showed uncertainty as to the cause of
the injuries.

These records were therefore in direct conflict with the

statements of Dr. Veasy who had continually represented to the
Chapmans that all indications from tests and records showed that the
injuries were the result of blood clots, that he "knew for a fact" that
the blood clots had caused her injury, that this event was
unavoidable and could have nothing to do with any negligence on the
part of anyone.

The Chapmans confronted Dr. Veasy with the

hospital records and say, at this point, that he admitted that the
6
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was successful

CR nt 142, infra.
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I In

somewhat inconsistent position that Jennifer's "legal injury" was
obvious all along.
Defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that the Utah
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations barred the medical
malpractice claims asserted by plaintiffs.

In the Lower Court the

defendants did not address the question of their negligence and
limited their motion solely to the statute of limitations.

Furthermore,

defendants focused upon a single act of negligence which occurred in
February, 1973.

No mention was made by the defendants or the trial

court in its order dismissing the case of the fact that the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants' negligence in the care of Jennifer
Chapman was ongoing, at least until March or April, 1985.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court below granted summary judgment when there were
material questions of fact on the question of whether the statute of
limitations had run in this case.

The trial court completely foreclosed

discovery over the objections of plaintiffs.

Notwithstanding the

inability of plaintiffs to obtain crucial information, they
demonstrated by affidavits that there were material questions as to
whether the defendants had hidden information from them and
whether false information had been given to them concerning the
cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
These questions of fact created genuine legal issues as to
whether the plaintiffs knew of the "legal cause" of the plaintiffs
injuries at a time which would have caused the statute of limitations
8
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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY § 78-14-4
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS).
In this case, as in others where the statute of limitations may

be applicable as an affirmative defense, the courts have placed a
heavy burden on the party asserting the defense. In such cases,
"(T)he party pleading the statute of limitations has the burden of
proving that the action is barred...."

Garland v. True Temper

Corporation. 354 F.Supp. 328, 330 (D.C.W.Va.1973). See Also, Ray v.
Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co.. dl70 Okl. 414, 40 P.2d 663 (1935);
Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Meldrim. 195 Ga. 765, 25 S.E.2d 567
(1943); Wahl v. Cunningham 320 Mo. 57, 6 S.W.2d 576 (1928).
Similarly, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (c) makes the statute of
limitations an affirmative defense.
Furthermore, since the defendants seek summary judgment, all
facts and the inferences to be drawn from them must be given the
interpretation most favorable to the plaintiffs. Therefore, the facts
set forth in the plaintiffs' statement of facts (supra) must, for
purposes of the motions in question here be taken as true since they
are supported by the affidavits of Robert and Teresa Chapman and
are not conclusively refuted by any evidence submitted by the
defendants.

Utilizing these facts the plaintiffs submitted to the trial

court 3 a list of
3

both the undisputed facts and the disputed facts

See P. 7 and 8 of plaintiffs1 memorandum in opposition to
defendants' motions for summary judgment (R. at 158-159)
10

which were gleaned from,, the record, before the ti ial court, ' rhey
follow:
Undisputed facts;
1 , For the first five months of her life, Jennifer Chapman
experienced several blue spells for which she was taken to a
hospital in Ogden, Utah for treatment.
2 When Jennifer was approximately five months old, the
doctors who had been treating her in Ogden sent her to Dr.
Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for specialized care.
3 Dr V easy examined Jennifer and diagnosed the illness
i heart problem which he attempted to stabilize with
medications until an operation could be performed. An
operation to install a device called a (iA ' aterston shunt was
subsequently performed. The first device did not function
properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was
performed to alter the shunt.
1. Jennifer suffered severe and permanently ...cabling
brain injuries while she w "as in the recovery room after the
second operation.
j
5. Since February 28, 1973, the Chapmans ai id Jennifer
maintained a continuing doctor-patient relationship with Dr.
Veasy and the Hospital which lasted until approximately March
or April 1985. A doctor-patient relationship between the
Chapmans arid, Jennifer existed with Di Meyers until
approximately June, 1983 During these periods Jennifer
received treatment for her brain damaged condition and its
complications from these defendants.

11

Disputed facts4:
1. Whether the defendants named herein told the
Chapmans that there were hospital records and tests which
showed that Jennifer's injuries were due to blood clots and that
her brain damage was unavoidable and could not be due to the
negligence of anyone and whether anything was said to the
Chapmans which would indicate that the nurses statements to
Mrs. Chapman that the heart monitor alarm was caused by
difficulties with the machine were untrue.
2. Whether the Chapmans relied on the assurances of the
defendants and believed that there were tests and records of
the Hospital which showed that Jennifer's injuries were in fact
caused by blood clots, were unavoidable, and could not have
been caused by any misconduct of the hospital employees or
referring physicians and whether they believed Dr. VeasyV
assurances to be true.
3. Whether prior to July, 1984 the Chapmans believed
the explanations of defendants as to the cause of Jennifer's
injuries and whether at or about that time Dr. Veasy changed
or altered his statements to the Chapmans on that subject.
4.
Whether prior to January, 1985 the Chapmans had no
medical evidence that the actual cause of Jennifer's injuries
was due to the negligence of the Hospital's employees and was
caused by a lack of oxygen and not blood clots as they had
previously been told by the defendants.

4

Plaintiff pointed out to the trial court that many of these facts
have not been mentioned by defendants in their affidavits. Plaintiff
therefore observed the these facts must be deemed to be
uncontroverted for purposes of the motions and that the facts were
placed under the heading of "disputed facts" since Dr. Veasyfs
affidavit maked the unsubstantiated assumption that ".. I know and
state that continuously since 1973 they (the Chapmans) have
believed ... that the episode ... in February 1973 was preventable and
resulted from medical negligence by those who attended her." (Veasy
affidavit P. 3. (R. at 159, R. at 108)
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A. I I I E STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED DURING A L U N i'lNUING
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN.
li is well established in ( Jtal i tl lat the statute of lin litatioi is foi
a medical malpractice action does not begin to run \ intil the
physician-patient relationship between the physician • : K- *i provider anil Ihr p.idrnt lu-i In i mli Inniiiiit
P.2d 244, 248 (Utah 1932).

Petcici

Kobism

Undei I Jtah law the existence of the

continuing physician-patient fiduciary relationship tolls tlle statute
lonship is
terminated.

Peteler at 248.

Utah's rule tolling the statute of

limitations during the existence of" this fiduciary relationship is ii i
Line

<, ith 1:1 le majority

• jurisdictions which hold tl lat the statute of

limitations does not -->CI;MI to iiim until I he physician-patient
relationship 'teriiilriat.es

o, i AiiLJlLL -"l 1"hy sicians a.nd Surgeons

§185 p..M2, Schmit v. Essen 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931);
Hotelling v. Walther. 169 Or. 559, 130 P2d 944 (1942); Grazor v.
Lh bin.... i i e , V l'«

Ealy v.

Sheppeck. 100 N.M.250, 669 P.2d 259 (1983); Sanchez v. South
Hoover Hospital. 132 Cal.Rptr. 657, 553 P,2cl 1129 (1976).
'Ih',1 .Supreme (/'oiii!' MI Washington ulsu lullowed this i ule m
Samuelson v. Freeman. 454 P.2d 406 (Wash. 1969) 5 .

That Court

summarized its holding as follows:
"In construing the statute
" limitations concerning
:
medical malpractice, we think it .:
rule that, if
5

Washington's Supreme Court has restated this rule in the
subsequent case of Bixler v. Bowman. 94 Wash.2d 146, 614 P.2d
1290 (1980)

malpractice is claimed during a continuous and substantially
uninterrupted course of treatment for that particular illness or
condition, the statute does not begin to run until the treatment
for that particular illness or condition has been terminated."
(citations omitted) Id. at 410.
Since it was uncontested that the defendants and the Chapmans
maintained physician-patient relationships with Dr. Veasy and the
Hospital until March or April, 19856 this fact should have been
dispositive below since the statute of limitations under such
circumstances would not begin to run until March or April, 1985, and
since this case was filed well within the period of the statute of
limitations.

B. THE DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENTED THE CAUSE OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES AND THE PLAINTIFF'S FAMILY DID NOT
KNOW OF JENNIFER CHAPMAN'S "LEGAL INJURY" UNTIL JULY OF
1984 AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT COMMENCE
RUNNING UNTIL THAT TIME.
The defendants relied principally on Section 78-14-4(l)(b) in
their attempt to establish that the statute of limitations had run.

A

portion of that statute provides:
In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been
prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health
care provider because that health care provider has
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within
one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs, (emphasis
ours) (The "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act" is reproduced as
6

Robert Chapman affidavit, paragraph 10. (R. at 144, infra at A-9)
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A-25 through

A riA

supplements reproduced i°

through A-41)
In Foil v. Ballinger. this Court held that the statute of
limitations
i

i

• medical malpra^v; actions begin* lo run v\

-

injury."
injuiv

Know

. ms suffered *

egal

This Court held that a person •..* usoovered his "legal
wiicii

*

ll i .il In I I Nil si a i in. il

an injury *mc ^ia. .i
(emphasis ours) Id
L' :...

t.

* •*

• A(U> caused by negligent action."
n ^ federal District Court has followed

u-H,u * «...i...:i8t """L)S I' 'Vipp, IV |IM

H|;ih 1%'H

in which the Court held:
"Under Foil, and its progeny, a legal
determination of negligence is not necessary
to start the statute of limitations. Rather, the
crucial question is whether the plaintiff was
aware of the facts that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that he may
have a cause of action against the health care
provider." (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original) H . at 155.
This Court's statement in Foil seems appropriate here:
"[Wjhen injuries arc suffered that have been
caused by an unknown act of negligence by
an expert, the law ought not to be construed
I destroy a right of action before a person
even becomes aware of the existence of that
right." L l at 14 7
Under the rule of these cases,
•••*-•'

tcrmiier

Chapmans : J not discover
" '

Februar

V i

'

> u f

1973, rne plaintiffs had been told by the

defendants that the injuries were
unavoidable injury which was *u**-v

,c ^>x.> -

:

<

Jhapmans,

y

tantamount to an act of God. They were further falsely told that the
hospital records and "tests" confirmed these facts, and that Dr. Veasy
"knew for a fact" that the blood clots had caused her injury.
Throughout the period in which these assurances were made, the
defendants had a physician-patient relationship with the Chapmans
and Jennifer and had a fiduciary duty to them.

Under such

circumstances they had an affirmative fiduciary duty to advise their
patients of the complete truth and all of the facts surrounding
Jennifer's injury. When the defendants' fiduciary duties demanded
that they convey all of the facts and any uncertainties which they
may have had, the Chapmans were given false information or
information which was calculated to conceal the true cause of the
injuries.
In the court below the defendants argued that if the Chapmans
"discovered" the injury prior to 1984 they couldn't have been
"prevented" from "discovering" it by the defendants.

The defendants

claimed that a letter written to Defendant Veasy by Robert Chapman
evidenced the plaintiffs' discovery of the "legal injury" in 1973. The
affidavit of plaintiff Robert Chapman demonstrates the fallacy of
defendants' argument 7 .

Mr. Chapman's letter must be viewed in

correct context and not as presented by the defendants.

At the time

of the letter, the Chapmans had been consulting with Dr. Veasy to
obtain his professional opinion as to whether there was negligence on
the part of the doctors from Ogden who treated Jennifer.

The

Chapmans wanted to know if these doctors were negligent for failing
to send Jennifer for care to Dr. Veasy sooner, and whether
7

if she

Robert Chapman affidavit Paragraph 5. (R. at 142, infra at A-7)
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were sent earlier, surgery could have been avoided.

Mr. Chapman's

statement in his letter that he thought that the ftegligence was
"obvious", refers to the delay of the Ogden doctors in sending
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy because they thought that earlier treatment by
Dr. Veasy might have lessened or avoided Jennifer's problems.

A

lawsuit was then pending or about to be pending against the Ogden
doctors, but no defendant in this suit was name4 in that suit. Indeed,
the Chapmans were persuaded by defendants that Jennifer's brain
damage was due to an unavoidable act of God, and they had no
intention of suing these defendants.

In summary, the letter from Mr.

Chapman to Dr. Veasy has nothing at all to do with this case or of the
discovery by the Chapmans of a cause of action against the
defendants herein.
The plaintiffs had a right to rely on the expertise and advice of
the defendants named herein, particularly when they had a fiduciary
duty to keep them fully informed and to protect them from further
injury.

These defendants should not now be permitted to complain

that the plaintiffs should not have believed theii or that they had no
right to rely upon their statements.
The foregoing discussion discloses that there were geniune
issues before the trial court as to when the plaintiffs "discovered" the
existence of the "legal injury" and the availability of a cause of action
and whether they were prevented from discovering these facts by
the defendants.

Thus it was error for the trial pourt to grant

summary judgment on this issue.
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C. THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS
ARE ESTOPPED FROM PLEADING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
If it is true that the defendants misrepresented or conspired to
misrepresent the true cause of the injuries suffered by Jennifer
Chapman, it then follows that there was a wrongful attempt to
conceal evidence which would indicate the true cause of Jennifer's
injuries.

Under such circumstances, a defendant is estopped- from

asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.
Utah follows the majority of jurisdictions and this Court has
found that a defendant is estopped from pleading the statute of
limitations where the defendant has concealed the existence of
material facts which would put the plaintiff on notice of the cause of
action. In Rice v. Granite School District. 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) it
was held that the defendant could not raise the statute of limitations
as a defense where the plaintiffs delay in filing the suit was induced
by the defendant.

This Court held:

"One cannot justly or equitably lull an
adversary into a false sense of security
thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of
limitations, and then be heard to plead that
very delay as a defense to the action when
brought. " (citations omitted) Id., at 163.
Several courts have held that defendants are estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where there is a
fiduciary relationship and a failure to disclose material information.
These courts have specifically considered the relationship between
physicians and their patients in terms of the effect it has on the
estoppel issue.

For example, the California Supreme Court has ruled
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that a defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a defense where he conceals material information about the
nature of or the cause of the plaintiffs injuries ^nd, as a result, the
plaintiff files suit after the statute of limitations has run.

Bowman v.

McPheeters.176 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1947); Stafford y.Shultz. 270 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1954).

Furthermore, it is widely held that the statute of

limitations is tolled by fraudulent or untruthful representation by a
physician as to the cause of a particular problem, Emmett v. Easter
Dispensary & Casualty Hospital,. 130 App. D.C. 50, 396 F.2d 931 (D. C.
Cir. 1967); Rodriguez v. Monoil. 9 Ariz. App. 2^5, 450 P2d 737
(1969); Proctor v. Schombert 63 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1953); Groedal v.
Westrate. 171 Mich. 92, 137 N.W. 87; Lakeman v. La France. 102 N.H.
300, 156 A2d 123 (1960).
There was, at the very least, a factual dispute as to whether the
defendants, who had fiduciary duties to the Chftpmans, had
misrepresented or concealed facts in this case.

&[f they did, they are

estopped from pleading the statute of limitation^.

The dispute over

this material issue made the granting of summary judgment by the
trial court inappropriate.
D. THE CLAIMED NEGLIGENT CARE OF THE PLAINTIFF BY
DEFENDANTS WAS ONGOING AND WITHIN THE PERIOD OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
No mention was made by the trial court of the fact that the
plaintiffs claimed that after Jennifer Chapman was injured, the
defendants continued to provide substandard care to her and that
this resulted in damage to her.

By granting summary judgment the
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trial court completely eliminated this important question of fact,
presumably ruling that as a matter or law, no substandard care was
rendered to Jennifer during the period within the statute of
limitations.

The trial court's ruling was made in the face of affidavits

from Robert and Teresa Chapman that the defendants provided care
to Jennifer until early 1985, well within the period of the statute of
limitations 8 .

It was patently unfair to the plaintiffs to deny them the

right even to obtain the defendants' records concerning the care
given to Jennifer (by foreclosing all discovery) and then to rule
without the benefit of affidavits or other evidence that the ongoing
care given to her was not substandard.
n. PLAINTIFFS PLED FRAUD WITH SUFFICIENT PARTICULARITY TO
SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The plaintiffs asserted claims for torts related to the
defendants' misconduct in concealing evidence and in violating their
fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs.

These torts included intentional

infliction of emotional distress, outrage, attempt to deprive the
plaintiffs of their causes of action9, fraud and fraudulent
concealment.

In the court below the defendants chose to ignore

these claims in their motion and singled out plaintiffs' allegations of

8 Affidavit of Robert Chapman (R. 140-145, infra A-5 through A-10);
Affidavit of Teresa Chapman (R. 146-151, infra A-11 through A-16)
9
See Smith v. Los Angeles 198 Cal Rptr 829 (1984) in which the
court recognized that it was actionable to spoil or destroy evidence
where it significantly prejudiced the plaintiffs case.
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fraudulent

concealment 10 .

The defendants claimed that plaintiffs'

cause of action for this tort was not pled with Enough particularity to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Defendants contended that plaintiffs' cause of action in

fraud should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were not able to
itemize each act of fraud and/or conspiracy to defraud the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs pointed out to no avail that they had been denied all
discovery and that the defendants' Rule 9(b) motion did not seek to
dispose of the other claims mentioned above which were being
asserted by plaintiffs.
Rule 9(b) should not and has not been so strictly interpreted by
the courts.

Rule 9(b) merely requires that the "circumstances

constituting fraud of mistake shall be stated with particularity."

This

requirement of the Rule has been met by the plaintiffs in their
complaint.

These circumstances of fraud are stated with sufficient

"particularity" by the plaintiffs in their complaint.

All that is

required is that the elements of fraudulent concealment be pleaded
by plaintiffs.

In this regard, the plaintiffs alleged that they had

relied on the assurances of the defendants who had continually told
them that the injuries were not the result of anV negligence on the
part of these defendants.

The plaintiffs have also pled the incidences

10

Utah has recognized that a a cause of action may lie for
fraudulent concealment. In Elder v. Clawson. 384 P.2d. 802 (Utah
1963), the Utah Supreme court spoke to this claim: "The principle is
basic in the law of fraud as it relates to nondisclosure that a charge
of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material facts is
under a duty, under the circumstances, to speakj and disclose this
information, but remains silent..."(citations omitted)
21

when the named defendants used fraudulent means to conceal the
true cause of the injuries.

Nothing more is required than a pleading

of adequate notice of these claims by a setting forth of the elements
of these claims and it was error for the trial court to grant summary
judgment on this issue 11 .
III.

THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A.

HISTORY:
Prior to 1976, the statute of limitations applicable to minors in

medical malpractice actions was tolled during the child's minority
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1953).

In 1976, the

Legislature passed the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Section 7814-4 of that Act purported to "apply to all persons regardless of
minority or other legal disability."

The following year, this Court

rendered its decision in Scott v. School Board of Granite School
District. 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), which held that "a minor claimant
is justly entitled to the protection afforded by § 78-12-36(1), ... in all
cases... to hold otherwise is a denial of due process and equal
protection."

fid, at 748 (emphasis added)].

In 1979, the Legislature made a minor amendment to § 78-144 in direct response to this Court's holding in Scott v. School Board.
As amended, the statute reads in pertinent part:
11 This
plaintiffs
formally
made in
summary

"The provisions of

should be particularly true where as here leave to amend
complaint was requested so as to permit plaintiffs to
incorporate into their complaint those factual averments
their memorandum in opposition to defendants motion for
judgment. (R. at 168)
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this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other
legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law..."

B.

THE MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DENIES EQUAL
PROTECTION AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.|
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is

unconstitutional as applied to minors.

The Utah Supreme Court so

held by necessary implication in Scott v. School Board of Granite
School District. 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), when it held that the
tolling provision in U.C.A. § 78-12-36, applied in favor of minors in
all cases.
In any event, the medical malpractice statute of limitations
denies minor plaintiffs equal protection under any substantive
standard of review.

There was and is no factual predicate to justify

elimination of minors' rights, and there is no evidence that the
statute has or will have any tendency to further the legislative
purposes of Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act.

The statute also

denies minor claimants' constitutionally protected right of access to
the courts by eliminating minors' causes of action before they ever
legally have a chance to assert them.

This is especially true in cases

such as this where the minor claimant not only suffers from the
disability of minority but is wholly incompetent as well.
In Scon v. School Board of Granite School District. 568 P.2d 746
(Utah 1977), the Supreme Court of Utah was presented with the
question of whether a minor plaintiff should be barred from suing a
school district for failure to comply with the notice provision in
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act.
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U.C.A.. § 63-30-13 (1953, as

amended). The specific issue in Scott v. School Board was whether
the limitation period (barring a claim unless notice was filed within
90 days of the occurrence) took precedence over the general tolling
provision in U.C.A.. §78-12-36(1), which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Effect of Disability. — If a person entitled
to bring an action ... is at the time the cause
of action accrued...
1. Under the age of majority ...
The time of such disability is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of the
action.
Scott vT SphQQl Bpfrrd holds:
[A] minor claimant is justly entitled to the
protection afforded by said §78-12-36(1)...
in all cases including notice requirements
of all the type contained in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
To hold
otherwise is a denial of due process and
egytal protection,
The Court's rationale for protecting the rights of minors demonstrates
that its holding is not limited to the facts in Scott, but applies to
minors "in all cases." The court stated:
A minor is incapable of giving notice by the
very virtue of his minority, nor may he
bring an action in his own behalf while a
minor. He simply has no standing by
statute, 1TJ.C A. § 15-2-1,] and an action by
or against a minor requires the appointment
of a guardian ad litem.
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The parents, or natural guardians, have no
specific legal duty to perform and h^ve no
responsibility to their natural off-spring
other than their moral obligation.
Consequently, in matters of this kincj, when
a parent or natural guardian fails fof one
reason or another to give notice, file suit,
or otherwise protect the minor's legil
interest, the minor is left completely
without a remedy. [LL at 747-48].
Scott v. School Board expressly reversed Gallegos v. Midvale
City. 27 Utah 2d. 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972), and Greenhalgh v.
Pavson Citv. 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975), both of; which held that
specific limitation periods mentioned in Utah's Govenmental
Immunity Act took precedence over the general tolling provision for
minority.

We believe that the argument for unconstitutionality is

much stronger in this case than in Scott, which was a case in which
the cause of action was a result of legislative gr^ce - that is, waiver
of governmental immunity, since this case involves a common law
cause of action for negligence.
The Utah Legislature itself recognized the applicability of Scott
to medical malpractice actions.

In 1979, the Legislature attempted to

cure the effect of Scott v. School Board on the malpractice statute of
limitations by amending § 78-14-4(2) as follow^:
The provision of this section shall apply to
all persons, regardless of minority and
other legal disability under § 78-12^36 or
any other provision of the law. ...
[Emphasis added.]
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Therefore the legislature, expressly recognizing the effect of
Scott on the statute, amended it in 1979 in an attempt to overrule
Scott. The Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. School Board, holding,
as a matter of constitutional law, that minors were

in all cases

entitled to the protection of the tolling provisions in § 78-12-36(1),
invalidated the malpractice limitations statute as applied to minors.
In Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the court stated that,
"the general rule from time immemorial is that the ruling of a court
is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively
and prospectively."

[Id., at 676] Thus, an amendment by the

legislature does not overrule or invalidate a court decision, but
rather changes the then existing law.

It is the legislature's job to

"make the law", and that of the judiciary to interpret it. Rampton v.
Barlow. 23 U.2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 383 (1970).

It seems apparent

that the legislature misread Scott to be a case of merely statutory
dimensions.

To the contrary, Scott's wellsprings are constitutional,

and the legislature cannot circumvent the constitution, as applied by
this Court, simply by making its denials of due process and equal
protection more explicit.

On its face, Scott is a constitutional ruling

by the Utah Supreme Court.

Thereafter, the legislature was

powerless to amend § 78-14-4 to preclude application of § 78-12-36
to the claims of minors 12 . The legislature is not free to make its own
constitutional interpretations, as that would be an impermissible
intrusion upon the primary function of the judicial branch.

12

See

Of significance we found no decisions by the Utah Supreme Court
which hold that a statute of limitations can be applied to minors;
actions in spite of the express language of § 78-12-36(1).
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Rampton v. Barlow. 23 U.2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 383 (1970)
the judiciary's primary function as interpreting the law).

(defining

The Utah

Health Care Malpractice Act statute of limitations purports to apply
to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.

This

statute violates Jennifer Chapman's constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and Article I, Sections 2 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.
In determining whether a statute violates equal protection, the
court must first decide the standard by which the statute is to be
judged.

Three tests have evolved for the consideration of a statute

under equal protection analysis:

the "strict-scrutiny" test; the

"means-focus: test; and the "rational basis" test.
C. STRICT SCRIJTTNY TEST
Some states have invalidated statutes limiting the right to
recover damages for personal injuries under the strict scrutiny test
on the basis that such a right is fundamental.

See. Kenyon v.

Hammer. 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984) (Arizona limitations period in
medical malpractice case found unconstitutional as applied to
minors); and White v. State. 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983). In White,
the Montana Supreme Court invalidated a statute limiting damages
recoverable against governmental entities based on Article II,
Section 16 of the Montana Constitution which is in all respects
identical to Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court has never determined whether the
right of a minor to recover damages for personal injuries in a medica
malpractice action is "fundamental",

but on the basis of the holding

in Scott v. School Board (a statute which offends the tolling provision
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of §78-12-36 denies minors due process and equal protection), we
believe that it will hold that the strict scrutiny test should be applied
in this case.

Should the Court so hold,

it will be defendants1 burden

to demonstrate the compelling state interests which justify the
abrogation of minors' rights.
D. MEANS-FOCUS TEST
The means-focus or "heightened scrutiny" standard of review
provides an intermediate level of review for equal protection
analysis between strict scrutiny and the rational basis test.

The

means-focus test has been used in areas where the rights involved
are substantial, not merely social policy or economic in nature, but
which do not rise to the level of fundamental interests or suspect
classifications.
Under the intermediate test for equal protection, there must be
a relationship between the statutory classifications created and the
purposes sought to be accomplished by the statute.

That is, the

classification (in this case abrogation of the tolling provisions § 7812-36(1) for minor victims of medical malpractice only) must be
directly and rationally related to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose.

The main objectives of Utah's Medical

Malpractice Act as set forth in § 78-14-2 were to decrease or
stabilize the cost of medical malpractice insurance and thereby
decrease or stabilize health care costs generally, as well as to ensure
the continued availability of insurance to Utah physicians, and
quality health care to Utah citizens.
Our attempts to determine the basis for Utah's medical
malpractice legislation in 1976 and 1979 has met with no success.
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So

far as we can tell, there is none.

What little legislative history there

is for the Act consists of self-serving declarations from malpractice
insurers that there was a "problem."

No explanation for the cause of

the problem was given the legislators, and the record is devoid of
any examples from Utah.

With regard to the so-called "long-tail"

problem with claims of minors, one New York case is cited.
The only evidence that is available indicates that the "long-tail"
or unfiled existing case potential problem with claims of minors, did
not and does not exist in Utah, and that the cost of malpractice
insurance premiums plays an infinitesimal role in the cost of health
care.

Where is the "long-tail" problem that motivated the Utah

Malpractice Act so that "liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably and accurately calculated?"

[§ 78-14-2].

The "long-tail"

problem, as any reasonable person would expect, was and is nonexistent.

The parents or guardians of an injured infant will naturally

assert its cause of action as soon as possible in i^iost instances. It is
only in the very rare case such as this where the child's legal injury
is not discoverable for four years, or where the parents are ignorant
or unmotivated that infants need the protection of a tolling statute
such as § 78-12-36(l).3

Those rare instances will cause no harm to
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insurance companies who routinely grossly overestimate future
losses in order to offset investment income13.
Malpractice awards and defense costs are paid by insurance
companies.

Insurance companies are not part of the health care

system, they are independently operated and immensely successful
businesses which, through issuance of malpractice insurance and
collection of premiums, play an indirect and insignificant role in
health care costs.

The occasionally large verdicts and settlements

that recieve a great deal of publicity and attention are not health
care costs.

The only cost to health care consumers involved in a

million dollar judgment against a physician is the premium that
physician pays annually for malpractice insurance.
The fact that an alleged medical malpractice "crisis" never
existed, or abated, was the basis for several states1 conclusions that
their malpractice acts were unconstitutional.

In Arneson v. Olson.

270 N.W. 2d 125 (N.D. 1978), the North Dakota Supreme Court struck
down that State's entire malpractice act, in part, on the basis of a
finding that no crisis existed.

The court stated:

13

By year-end 1983, the Utah Medical Insurance Association
("UMIA"), Utah's primary malpractice carrier, had paid out a total of
$2.7 million on claims in its five-year history. During the same
period it had collected over $15 million in premiums, and earned
$4.3 million in investment income. Yet, for 1983 alone, UMIA
claimed $3.1 million in unpaid losses (more than its five-year total),
to bring its total unpaid losses as of the year-end 1983 to over $8.5
million. (Sources: UMIA financial statement for 1983, and Best's
Insurance Reports for property-casualty companies, 1983 and 1984.)
Note that these disproportionate projections all took place during a
period when minors' causes of action were statutorily limited to a
maximum of four years.
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The evidence in the case before us,
indicates that either the legislature
misinformed or subsequent events
changed the situation substantially.
at 136].

however,
was
have
[Id.

The court in Arneson utilized the intermediate test for equal
protection analysis. In Boucher v. Sayeed. 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983),
the court utilized the lower-tier rational-basis standard in finding its
entire malpractice act unconstitutional.

The court stated:

Because no obvious crisis exists to support
the challenged legislation, we shall ...
decline to speculate about unexpressed or
unobvious permissible state interests.
Absent a crisis to justify the enactment of
such legislation, we can ascertain no
satisfactory reason for the separate and
unequal treatment that it imposes on medical
malpractice litigants. The statute
constitutes special class legislation
enacted solely for the benefit of specially
defined defendant health-care providers.
[Id* at 93].
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated unequivocally that the
original factual predicate for a statute and any subsequent change
from the situation which prompted the legislation are relevant to
equal protection analysis.

See, discussion of Mai an v. Lewis, infra.

The evidence available clearly demonstrates that there is no
factual predicate for the discriminatory classification created by §
78-14-4 and that abrogation of minors' rights guaranteed by § 7812-36(1) will not substantially further the objectives of the
malpractice act.

Therefore, § 78-14-4 should be found
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unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection insofar as the statute
applies to minors.
E. THE RATIONAL BASTS TEST
Under the rational basis test for equal protection, a statute will
be found constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate legislative purpose.

Allen v. Intermountain Health Care.

635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981).
The real effect of § 78-14-4 is to single out a tiny minority of
injured malpractice victims to bear the entire burden of:

reducing

the cost of malpractice insurance; preventing the excessive practice
of defensive medicine; reducing health care costs generally; making
sure physicians stay in Utah; and making sure malpractice insurance
remains available in Utah.
amended)].

fSee. Utah Code Ann.

§78-14-2 (1953, as

That is a considerable burden for Jennifer Chapman and

malpractice victims like her to bear.

Since she and others like her

had no say whatever in the legislation, this court should look closely
at the legislation to see if it is, in fact, rational. This Court has a duty
to protect the important rights of individuals, especially individuals,
like minors, who are unable to speak for themselves.

There is little

doubt that the Utah Supreme Court does not consider the rational
basis test a rubber-stamp for ill-conceived and ineffective legislation.
In Malan v. Lewis. 693 P2d 661 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme
Court struck down this state's automobile guest statute.

Malan

provides unambiguous evidence of the Utah Supreme Court's
willingness to closely scrutinize a statute whose discriminatory effect
is obvious. The Utah court explicitly stated that it is not bound to
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apply the federal rubber-stamp analysis under tthe rational basis
test.

This court stated:
Although Article I, Section 24 of the Utah
Constitution incorporates the same general
fundamental principles as are incorporated
in the equal protection clause, our constitution
and application of Article I, Section 24 are not
controlled by the Federal courts' construction
and application of the equal protection clause.
Case law developed under the Fourteenth
Amendment may be persuasive in applying
Article I, Section 24 ..., but that law is not
binding so long as we do not reach 3 result
that violates the equal protection clause.
(Citations omitted.) The different language
of Article I, Section 24, the different constitutional
contexts of the two provisions, and different
jurisprudential considerations may le&d to a different
result in applying equal protection principles under
Article I, Section 24 than might be reached under Federal
law. [Id.]
It is difficult to determine exactly what test the court applied

for eqttal protection.

All indications are that it utilized the rational

basis test, although, if that is the case, it is clear that Utah's rational
basis test has teeth.

The equal protection analysis was based on

Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which provides:
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

"All

It was

explained that Article' I, Section 24 was meant to protect against two
types of discrimination:
First, law must apply equally to all persons
within a class. (Citations omitted). $econd.
the statutuorv classifications and the different
treatment given the classes must be based on
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differences that thave a reasonable tendency
to further the objectives of the statute. Citing.
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, other
citations omitted.) If the relationship of the
classification to the statutory objectives is
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination is
unreasonable. [Id.] (emphasis added).]
The court's holding is clear that a statutory classification must be
based on differences which have a reasonable tendency to further
the objectives of the statute, and, if the relationship to the statutory
objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination is
unreasonable.

Indeed, the majority of the Malan equal protection

analysis involves a determination of whether the "classifications
established [by the guest statute] provide a reasonable basis for
promoting [the statute's] objectives."

[Id.] The court goes on to state:

When persons are similarly situated, it is
unconstitutional to single out one person or
group of persons from among a larger class
on the basis of a tenuous justification that
has little or no merit. [Id.]
And still further:
Equal protection of the law, both state and
federal, "requires more of a state law than
non-discriminatory application within the
class it establishes." (Citations omitted.)
The classification must rest on some
difference which "bears a reasonable and
just relation to the act in respect to which
the classification is proposed, and can never
be made arbitrarily and without any such
basis ... [Arbitrary selection can
never be justified by calling it
classification." (Citations omitted.) "The
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courts must reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn in a
statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose..." (Citations omitted.) [Id..]
Not only is § 78-14-4 as applied to minors unreasonable in light of
its purpose, it also irrationally discriminates within the class of
tortiously injured minors by applying the shortened statute of
limitations only to medical malpractice victims.

Significantly, the

Utah Supreme Court held the attempt to limit minors' causes of
action in governmental immunity cases unconstitutional despite the
same policy considerations which allegedly exist on the malpractice
area, namely; to limit the cost of insurance and claims, and to
decrease the burden on the public who indirectly must pay such
increased costs.

F.

THE MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATION

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DEPRIVES MINOR PLAINTIFFS OF ACCESS TO

THg COURTS
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have a remedy
by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.
[Emphasis added].
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The effect of § 78-14-4 on minors is to bar their cause of action in
malpractice cases before they ever legally have a chance to assert it.
As such, the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution is plainly
violated and the statute should be struck down, at least as it pertains
to minors. [See^concurring opinion of Justice Howe in Myers v.
McDonald, supra. 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).]
The best example of a case construing an open court's provision
in a medical malpractice context is Sax v. Votteler. 648 S.W.2d 661
(Tex. 1983). Sax is identical to this case in all relevant respects.
Prior to 1975, Texas law allowed for the tolling of limitations in all
tort actions by minors until two years after attaining majority or
removal of disabilities.

In 1975, the legislature changed the

limitations period in malpractice actions to two years from the date
of treatment, and specifically provided that, "This section applies to
all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability."
Article I, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution (substantially
identical to Utah's Art. I, Section 11) provides in relevant part:

"All

courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, ...
shall have remedy by due course of law."

In determining the

constitutionality of the statute under the open courts provision, the
Texas court utilized the following test:
We hold, therefore, that the right to bring
a well-established common law cause of
action cannot be effectively abrogated by
the legislature absent a showing that the
legislative basis for the statute outweighs
the denial of the constitutionallyguaranteed right of redress. In applying
this test, we consider both the general
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purpose of the statute and the extent
to which the litigants' right to redress is
effected. [LL at 665-66].
The Court, with reasoning virtually identical to that of the Utah
Supreme Court in Scott v. School Board, held the statute
unconstitutional as applied to minors.

The Court held:

A child has no right to bring a cause of
action on his own unless disability has been
removed. (Citations omitted.) If a minor
does bring a cause of action in his own
behalf, the action is subject to being
abated upon a timely plea of the defendant.
(Citations omitted.) If the parents,
guardians, or next friends of the child
negligently fail to take action in the
child's behalf within the time
provided..., the child is precluded from
asserting his cause of action under that
statute. Furthermore, the child is
precluded from suing his parents on account
of their negligence, due to the doctrine of
parent-child immunity. (Citations omitted)
The child, therefore, is effectively
barred from any remedy if his parents
fail to timely file suit. Respondents argue
that parents will adequately protect the
rights of their children. This court, however,
cannot assume that parents will act in such
a manner. It is neither reasonable nor
realistic to rely upon parents, who may
themselves be minors, or who may be
ignorant, lethargic, or lack concern, to
bring a malpractice lawsuit action Within
the time provided, fid, at 666-67].
The Utah Supreme Court unequivocally voiced its displeasure
at this possibility in Foil v. Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), (see
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supra) a case in which the court held that the "discovery rule"
applies to medical malpractice actions.

With regard to the

elimination of a cause of action before it accrues, the court stated:
To say that a cause of action accrues to a
person when she may maintain an action
thereon and at the same time, that it
accrues before she has or can reasonably be
expected to have knowledge of any wrong
inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent
and unrealistic. She cannot maintain an
action before she knows she has one. To say
to one who has been wronged, "you had a
remedy, but before the wrong was
ascertainable to you, the law stripped you
of your remedy," makes a mockery of the
law. [IsL at 148-49 (citations omitted.)]
Under §78-14-4 a minor has a maximum of four years in which
to assert a cause of action whether or not his injury is discovered or
known to him.

The statute, of course, has the same potential effect

with adults, with one major difference.

An adult has four years in

which to discover and file a claim. The adult at least has a chance. A
minor cannot file a claim on his own behalf even if a legal injury is
discovered.

The minor must depend on third persons to assert a

claim for him.

It begs the question to assert that the statute is saved

by its "plaintiff or patient" language.

That does nothing to change the

fact that there is no one with a legal obligation to protect a minor
plaintiffs interests, and a minor, particularly a completely
incompetent one, like Jennifer Chapman is powerless to protect his or
her own. The reasoning of the Utah Court in Switzer v. Reynolds. 606
P.2d 244, 248-49 (Utah 1980), is completely consistent with this
reasoning.

In Switzer it was held that the statute of limitations for
38

wrongful death actions was tolled during a claimant's minority
despite the fact that an action could be brought on behalf of the
minor by a parent or guardian.

This was also the precise rationale

for the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in Barrio v. San Manuel
Division Hospital for Magma Copper Company. ^92 P.2d 290 (Ariz.
1983).

In 1976 Arizona passed its own special statute of limitations

for malpractice actions fA.R.S. § 12-564(D)], which said it applied
"notwithstanding the provisions of § 12-502" wljich is Arizona's
general tolling provision applicable to minors three years or until the
age of ten to bring a cause of action for medical malpractice.

Arizona

had previously held that the right to maintain a cause of action for
personal injuries was fundamental.
961 (Ariz. 1984).]

[Kenyon v. Hammer. 688 P.2d

Nevertheless, its rationale fob striking down the

statute of limitations as applied to minors in medical malpractice
actions is persuasive under any standard.

The court stated:

We have held that "an infant cannot bring or
defend a legal proceeding in person."
(citations omitted) We are aware, o$
course, that an action can be brought on
behalf of the minor by a next friend,
guardian ad litem, or general guardian. No
doubt, most claims of minors are so
presented. We are well aware that where a
chance of substantial recovery exists, there
is no lack of advocates willing to undertake
appropriate procedures to find and appoint a
guardian ad litem or to obtain a "next
friend" so that the action may be brought.
While the vast majority of claims on behalf
of injured minors will still be brought
within a relatively short time after the
injury occurs, this all depends upon good
fortune; the minor himself is helpless,
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particularly when under ten years of age.
The minor possesses a right guaranteed by
the constitution, but cannot assert it
unless someone else, over whom he has no
control, learns about it, understands it, is
aware of the need to take prompt action, and
in fact takes such action.
We recognize, also, that some children are
without parents or have parents who do not
fulfill commonly accepted parental
functions. The statute makes no exception
for children who have unconcerned parents,
children in foster care, or those in
institutions; ...
As to parents themselves, some are lazy or
frightened or ignorant or religiously
opposed to legal redress. Still, they have
their remedy available to them if they
choose to use it. A child does not. rid.1
There is no reason why the rationale in Sax and Barrio, which is
identical to that utilized by the Utah Supreme Court in Scott v. School
Board, should not apply in a medical malpractice case. Section 7814-4, as applied to Jennifer Chapman denies her access to the courts,
and is thereby unconstitutional.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that any statute which
purports to deny minors the protection of the tolling provision in
Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-36-12(1) is unconstitutional as a denial of due

process and equal protection.

The medical malpractice statute of

limitations attempts to abrogate that tolling provision and is thereby
unconstitutional.

The medical malpractice statute of limitations is

also unconstitutional on the ground that it denies minors access to
the courts as guaranteed by Utah Constitution. Art. I, Section 11.
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Very significantly this Court passed upon a constitutional
question similar to the one raised in this case in }he recent Utah case
of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). That
case involved the Utah Statute of Repose.

Beech Aircraft claimed

that the minor plaintiffs claims were barred because they were not
asserted within the statutory period since the tin}e periods set forth
in the statute had run before plaintiffs claims aro$e.

The trial court

awarded Beech summary judgment on all theories of liability on the
ground that Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability Act ("Act"), U. C.
A., 1953, 7B-15-1, £ts£jj.M barred all actions against Beech.

Section 3

of the Act, commonly called a statute of repose, provides:
(3) No action shall be brought for the recovery of
damages for personal injury, death or damage to property
more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or
consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture of a
product, ..."
The plaintiffs made the same claim we make for exactly the same
reasons. They relied upon Article I, Section II oti the Utah
Constitution which declares that an individual shall have a right to a
"remedy by due course of law" for injury to one's "person, property,
or reputation." and claimed that the statute of repose which deprived
the plaintiffs of that right violated that provision.
The plaintiffs claimed that although the statutory provision in
question purported to grant a reasonable time for the filing of a
claim the plaintiffs claims had expired before th^ir causes of action
accrued and they were deprived of that right.

Ift forming its opinion

that the statute in question was unconstitutional, the court
exhaustively reviewed the historical roots of the constitutional
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provision and the decisions construing it and cited the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Wilson v. Iseminger. 185 U. S. 55 (1902).
It commented that the Wilson court "noted the fundamental
obligation of government to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs
done persons" and quoted from the case with approval as follows:
Every government is under obligation to its
citizens to affords them all needful legal
remedies. . . . A statute could not bar the
existing rights of claimants without affording
this opportunity (to try rights in the courts); if
it should attempt to do so, it would not be a
statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt
to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever
might be the purport of its provisions.
" M.
at 62.
The

Berry court went on to quote "the basic rule" from 51 Am.

Jur. 2d Limitations of Actions. 28, at 613:
It is riot within the power of the
legislature, under the guise of a limitation
provision, to cut off an existing remedy
entirely, since this would amount to a denial
of justice, and, manifestly, an existing right of
action cannot be taken away by legislation
which shortens the period of limitation to a
time that has already run.
For the foregoing reasons, the statute in question should be
declared unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The court below granted summary judgment when there were
material questions of fact on the question of whether the statute of
limitations had run in this case.

Those questions included questions
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as to whether the defendants had hidden information from the
plaintiffs as to the cause of the plaintiffs injuries and whether false
information had been given to plaintiffs.

Arising from the questions

of fact were issues as to whether the plaintiffs know of the "legal
cause" of the plaintiffs injuries and whether th$ defendants were
estopped to raise these issues.

In addition the trial court barred all

discovery and granted summary judgment on the pleading of the
fraud issue by the plaintiff when this issue was properly pled and
placed into issue by plaintiffs and upon the question of whether care
provided by the defendants within the period of the statute of
limitations was negligently done.
This court has held that statutes which deny minors the equal
protection of the laws, due process or access to the courts are
unconstitutional.

The medical malpractice statute of limitations

attempts to do just that and is unconstitutional.
In consequence of all of the arguments set forth herein,
appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse the summary
judgment and dismissal on behalf of defendants entered by Judge
Wilkinson below, and Order that the matter proceed to trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J>_ day of August, 1986.

P. Richard Meyer
Robert N. Williams
P. O. Box 2608
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
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Kathryn Collard
401 Boston Bldg.
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 534-1664
Utah Bar No. 697
Counsel for Appellants

44

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify, as counsel for Appellant, that four (4) true
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upon counsel for Respondents by mailing on the

of August,

1986, addressed as follows:
Gary B. Ferguson
Richards, Brandt, et al
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Lloyd B. Poelman
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Stephen B. Nebeker
Thomas A. Quinn
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Counsel for Appellant
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B. Lloyd Poelman - A2617
David B. Erickson - A3788
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Veasy, Bowman & Hospital Entities
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN,
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER
Civil No. C85-6782

vs.
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL,
et al. [Redesignated I.H.C.
HOSPITALS, INC., et al.]

(HON. HOMER F. WILKINSON)

Defendants.

The motions to modify the designation of the hospital
defendants, for summary judgment, and to dismiss of defendants
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a hospital oirganized to do business
in the State of Utah; PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a
hospital organized to do business in the State of Utah;
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba PRIMARY
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; IHC HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation dba
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or
McConkie
Jushnell
jonal Corporation |
300 EAST
LAKE CITY
*H 84111

0O02&t>
A-l

present Utah corporation dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
("hospital defendants") L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., and KAREN BOWMAN,
R.N., and the motion to dismiss of defendant Garth Meyers, M.D.,
having come on regularly before the above-entitled court on
February 5, 1986, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, and
the court having reviewed the memoranda, pleadings, affidavits
and records on file and having heard oral argument from counsel,
and having taken the matter under advisement and finding that
good cause has been shown, and that there is no just reason for
delaying entry of final judgment herein as to these parties,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) the motion to modify

the designation of hospital defendants, being without opposition,
is granted and the names of the hospital defendants in this
action are removed and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a Utah
corporation, d/b/a Primary Children's Medical Center is
substituted therefor; and (2) the motions for summary judgment
and to dismiss of the defendants L. George Veasy, M.D., Karen
Bowman, R.N. and the hospital defendants, and the motion to
dismiss of defendant Garth Meyers are granted and final judgment
in favor of said defendants and against the plaintiffs is hereby
entered with prejudice.
DATED this

«E$ig
McConkie
jshnell
>nal Corporation ]
300 EAST
AKE CITY
-I 84111

/

f
day of Ma-reh-, 1986.

OMER F. WILKINSON
District Judge

00 &

&

Approved as to form:

J^j I

Rob^ift N. Williams, Esq. /
Attorney for Plaintiffs

ufo*^*-^

Gary B./Ferguson, Esq.'
Attorney^for Defendant Meyers

L/S . Cl'oyd Poe lina n
Attorney for Defendants Veasy, Bowman
and Hospital Defendants
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This is to certify that I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER, by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, on this the

day of March, 1986

to the following:
Kathryn Collard, Esq,
401 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
P. Richard Meyer, Esq.
Robert N. Williams, 'Esq.
P. 0. Box 2608
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq.
Gary D. Stott, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
B. Lloyd Poelman, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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P. Richard Meyer
R o b e r t N. Williams
A t t o r n e y s at law
165 West Pearl
Jackson,
Wyoming
(307) 733-8300
Attorneys

for

IN THE

Plaintiffs

THIRD trrnrriAj

nicTD;

LAKE COUNTY

JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually,
)
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF ROi
CHAPMAN
Civil No. C55-6752

vs.

WILKINSON)

Defendants.

tf>
d?

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Robert Chapman, being first duly sworn under
deposes

and

1.

oath

says:

I am one of the plaintiffs in the above entitled matter.

My

wife, Teresa, and I are the parents of Jennifer Chapman who was
born on August

10,

brain damaged.

She will never walk, or talk, and is permanently and

irreversibly

1972.

disabled,

She is now 13 years old and is severely

completely

incompetent,

and

wholly

dependent upon others for all of her bodily functions.
2.

During the first five months of her life, Jennifer

experienced

several blue spells for which she was taken to a hospital in Ogden,
Utah for treatment.

The doctors who had been treating her in Ogden

had not been able to properly diagnose the problem and then sent
her to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for
care.

specialized

Dr. Veasy diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which he

attempted to cure with medication.

After

the problem an operation was performed
Waterston shunt.
February

medication failed to cure
to install a device called a

The first shunt did not functon properly and on

28, 1973, a second operation was performed

to adjust

the

shunt.
3.

Jennifer recovered from the anesthesia and

permitted to visit with her.
awake.

After some

10 to

we were

I observed that Jennifer was crying and
15 minutes had passed my wife

returned

to visit her again and according to my wife she stayed in the room
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6. Soon after Jennifer received her brain damage we filed suit
against the Ogden doctors who had treated Jennifer for the blue
spells she had experienced during the first five months of her life.
We claimed that the Ogden physicians had waited too long to send
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy for specialized care.

Dr. Veasy persuaded us

and our lawyers that although he was critical of the delay on the part
of the Ogden doctors in sending Jennifer to him for care, that he
"knew for a fact" that Jennifer's brain damage was due to blood clots,
that it was unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's misconduct.
Veasy recommended dismissal of the suit.

Dr.

Based upon Dr. Veasy's

statements we dismissed the suit against the Ogden physicians.

At

that time and at all times up until July, J 954 we believed and
trusted Dr. Veasy and relied upon the statements he made to us.
7.

After the dismissal of the Ogden case the defendants Veasy,

Meyers and the Hospital continued to provide treatment to Jennifer
and they continued to represent to us that the medical records and
tests showed that the cause of her injuries were blood clots and that
it was unavoidable and that any omission on the part of the nurses
did not cause Jennifer's brain damage.

We trusted and believed the

defendants until the summer of 1954, when we received medical
records of the Hospital which related to Jennifer's injuries.

Contrary

to the statements of the defendants I discovered that the medical
records did not contain any tests results which would indicate the
true cause of Jennifer's injuries and they showed uncertainty as to
the cause of the injuries.

These records were therefore in direct

conflict with the statments of Dr. Veasy to us.
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JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA
CHAPMAN, individually.
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF

The undersigned
under

oath
1.

Teresa Chapman, being first

duly

sworn

deposes and says:

I am one of the plaintiffs in the above titled matter.

I am

competent to testify to the matters and things set forth in this
affidavit and things are true except those things which are set forth
on my information and belief and, as to those things, I believe them
to be true.
2.

My husband, Robert, I and are the parents of Jennifer

Chapman.
old.

She was born on August 10, 1972, and is now 13 years

Jennifer is severely brain damaged.

and is permanently

disabled.

She will never walk, or talk:

She is completely

wholly dependent on others for all of her bodily
3.

incompetent,

and

functions.

Jennifer, who seemed otherwise normal to us experienced

several blue spells in the first five months of her life.

My husband

and I took her to some doctors in Ogden, Utah for treatment of these
blue spells.

Those doctors failed to completly diagnose her condition

and they referred
for

specialized
4.

attempted
performed.

us to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital

treatment.

Dr. Veasy diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which he
to stabilize with medication until an operation
An operation was subsequently

device called a Waterston shunt.
properly and on February

performed

could be

to install a

The first shunt did not function

28, 1973, a second operation

was

performed to adjust the shunt.
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blood clots that flooded her brain and that he "knew for a fact" that
the blood clots had caused her injury.

In addition, he said that this

event was unavoidable and had nothing to do with any negligence on
the part of anyone.
6.

Soon after Jennifer received her brain damage we filed suit

against the Ogden doctors who had treated Jennifer for the blue
spells she had experienced during the first five months of her life.
We claimed that the Ogden physicians had waited too long to send
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy for specialized care.

Dr. Veasy was critical of

the delay on the part of the Ogden doctors in sending Jennifer to him
for care, but he persuaded us and our lawyers that he "knew for a
fact" that Jennifer's brain damage was due to blood clots, that it was
unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's misconduct.
recommended dismissal of the suit.

He

Based upon Dr. Veasy's

statements we dismissed the suit against the Ogden physicians

At

that time and at all times up until July, 1954, we believed and
trusted Dr. Veasy and relied upon the statements he made to us.
9.

After the dismissal of the Ogden case the defendants Veasy,

Meyers and the Hospital continued "to provide treatment to Jennifer
and they continued to represent to us that the medical records and
tests showed that the cause of her injuries were blood clots and that
it was unavoidable and that any omission on the part of anyone
caused Jennifer's brain damage.

No one associated with any of the

defendants ever told me that the nurse's statements to me, that the
heart monitor was functioning incorrectly, were false.
10. We trusted and believed the defendants until the July of
1984, when we received medical records of the Hospital which

related *
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During these periods Jennifer received treatment for her brain
damaged condition and its complications from all of these
defendants.
Dated this 16th day of January, 1986.

Teresa

Chapman

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of January, 1986.

Notary
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[Typed copy of Exhibit "A"]

Dr. George Veasy
Primary Childrens Hospital
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Dr. Veasy:
Some time ago I sat in your office and asked that you advise
me and help me to make a decission concerning a malpractice suite
in Jennifers behalf. Since that meeting I have given daily
thought and prayer as to which dirrection I should go in
providing Jennifer with security for the time she will be here on
earth. I am writing this letter so that you will have a better
understanding of our situation and why I am making the decision
that I am.
First of all in our meeting you seemed more concerned about
what our atorney would bennifit from the case rather than what
Jennifer could obtain. We sat and talked for probably an hour
and a half and never once did you ask how Jennifer was doing.
You refered only to those damn lawers and the blood money that I
was seeking. I have pondered this in my hart daily sience that
meeting. I was raised in a religious home and taught honesty and
respect for working to obtain what we have. Our profit has
warned us against accepting filthy lucre and that money in of
itself is not evil but the honesty and (undecipherable) in which
we obtain it is the important fact.
I would at this time like to assure you that obtaining
filthy lucre or blood money as you have called it is not my
intention. I am not seeking to destroy any doctors or put a
hospital out of business. Insurance premiums our paid to protect
us all against hardship in this world. I have to insure my
business against fire, theft, and accident to protect me as a
business man. It is not something that only doctors pay.
What has brought me to the decision to go ahead with the
suite are two events that have happened in our lives and I would
like to explain them to you so you can understand our feelings.
First of all in our home we have living with us an uncle who
is mentally handicaped. We live with him to take care of his
needs and try to bring him some sort of happiness in this life.
We have now found it necessary to move after five years of caring
for this man. We find that the cost of housing is increasing so

oooo
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rapidly and our family is growing to quickly that we have no
alternative but to get into our own home. In the nearly five
years we have been here not one relative has offered to help us
with this burden. We have become the center of jealousy and back
biting among religious people. Now that we are building our own
home it seems that no one wants the responsibility of caring for
Uncle Lynn. The fighting and accusing is already taking place.
It looks as though I might have to build an extra room in our
basement to let him live in because no one wants him. I can not
in good conciance after what has happened here in the last five
years leave Jennifer as a burden to someones family if something
should happen to Teresa or I before she is gone. The burdens and
responsibilities have been tremendous.
On Feb. 24th of this year my wife and our five children were
driving to pick me up from work when an International Scout went
out of control and ran into the back of our car. At this point
there were some minor injuries but everyone seemed to be okay.
Because of the impact the doors were jamed and they could not get
out of the car. While they were waiting for help a semi truck
and trailer went out of control and hit them again knocking them
a hundred and fifty feet down the highway and completely
demolishing our vehicle. When the police Arrived they found my
wife unconcious in the back seat of the cap and my eight year old
boy administering first aid to Jennifer and our baby Cory. The
entire family had to be taken to the hospital and treated.
Teresa, Jennifer and Cory were admitted because of their
injuries. They were there for a period of five days before being
released. While they were there the nurses found it so difficult
to care for Jennifer that in five days they fed her exactly 1/2
of one meal. That 1/2 of a meal took a nurse over 1-1/2 hours to
get down her. The rest of the meals were fed to her buy me. I
had to close up my business to care for her. I takes a
tremendous amount of paciance to care for her and I can't leave
her to die in the hands of people who don't care for her and love
her the way we do. Because of the accident I realize how close I
came to losing my wife and children. Had Teresa been killed
Jennifer would have been left in this world without the ability
to care for herself and it would be just a matter of time before
she would be back to the stage we brought her home from the
hospital in four years ago as doctor Myer put it, a vegetable.
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified medically or
legally to answer all the questions pertaining to a malpractice
suite. The way I understand the law the burden of proof is on me
to prove both negligence and physical damage. The negligence is
obvious but to what extent the physical damage can be linked to
this negligence only a man of your medical knowledge can know for
-2A-23

OCOtflV

sure. I do know that besides being mentally and physically
handicaped Jennifer also has an enlarged heart making it
impossible for her to ever lead any kind of normal active life
and eventually will be the cause of her death. She was hurt and
hurt bad because of wrong decisions made in her early life. The
laws in the state of Utah allow for compensation for pain and
suffering. She suffered and felt pain for the first five months
of her life only to be turned away by doctors that didn't have
time for little girls that could hold their breath. She felt
death in her soul at least twice a month and fought for her very
life only to have it completely destroyed. You told me if she
had died you would have been obligated to testify in her
behalf. A dead person feels no pain and suffering. She is
entitled to security for as long as she is willing to go on
struggling for her life. This case has to be weighed upon its
individual merits and not by what it costs for insurance for each
bed in a hopsital. I reemphasize that I am not seeking to
destroy anyone or collect a fortune in blood money. The help
provided by the state and federal governments to the handicapped
are a mockery to the society we live in. They only provide
administrative moneys and do nothing for the individual
patient. I can no longer depend on other people to care for my
daughter. She is only loved in our home and the financial burden
is to great for me to bare alone. I don't know what Jennifers
future will bring but as her father I beg you to consider
Jennifer as an individual and not an insurance burden to each bed
in each hospital. Before too long my atorney will be in contact
with you and I ask that you realize that he represents Jennifers
interests and set aside your feeling toward the legal
profession. It is imparative that we have honest factual
answers.
I do hope that we can continue through life as the best of
friends and that I can alway intrust Jennifers life in your very
capable hands.
Sincerely,

Robert Chapman
P.S.

Thanks for your time.

-3A-24

000°^

78-13-11

JUDICIAL CODE

Waiver.
If no objection is made to jurisdiction of
court to which case was transferred by
court on its own motion, or to any of the
proceedings growing out of order changing
place of trial, it is waived; objection comes
too late if made for nrst time in Supreme

Couit. Elliot v. Whitmore, 10 U. 246,
**• 4(31, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3
„ .. .
. _, Collateral
References,
VenueO=374.
92 C.J.S. Venue § 197.
77 Am. Jur. 2d 938, Venue § 88.

78-13-11. Duty of clerks—Fees and costs—Effect on jurisdictioi]
"When an order is made transferring an action or proceeding for tr
the court must transmit the pleadings and papers therein to the co
to which it is transferred. The costs and fees therefor and filing
papers anew must be paid by the party at whose instance the order \
made; provided, that when such order is made for the reason that
cause was commenced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer t
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff in the action wit
ten days after the making of such order, or said cause shall be dismis
for want of jurisdiction. The court to which an action or proceeding
transferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction as if it had b<
originally commenced therein.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-13-11.
, , .T .
Compiler s Notes.
^
This section is similar to former section
104-4-11 (Code 1943) which was repealed
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.

Collateral References.
Venue<©=>79, 80.
92 C.J.S. Venue § 207.
^
? 7 A m > Jup> £ d g
Venue
,
Power to withdraw or modify oi
granting change of venue, 59 A. L. E. •

CHAPTER 14
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDER!
Section 78-14-1.
78-14-2.
78-14-3.
78-14-4.
78-14-5.
78-14-6.
78-14-7.
78-14-8.
78-14-9.
78-14-10.
78-14-11.

Short title of act.
Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.
Definition of terms.
Statute of limitations—Exceptions—Application.
Failure to obtain informed consent—Proof required of patient—
fenses—Cons0nt to health care.
Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarantee, T
ranty, contract or assurance of result.
Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint.
Notice of intent to commence action.
Professional liability insurance coverage for providers—Insura
commissioner may require joint underwriting authority.
Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Act not retroactive—Exception.

78-14-1. Short title of act).—This act shall be known and may be ci
as the "Utah Health Care Malpractice Act."
History: L. 1976, en. 23, § 1.
f A .
Title of Act.
^
^
An act relating to malpractice actions
against health care providers; providing
a definition of health care providers; providing for a shortening of the statute of
limitations for malpractice actions; pro-

viding for a prohibition of ad dami
clauses in malpractice actions; provid
requirement for notice prior to fi]
a
malpractice actions; providing for p
odic payment of future damages awar
in malpractice actions; p r o v i n g fo
revision of the collateral source rule
malpractice actions; providing for a c
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Whitmore, 10 U. 246, 37
I Comp. Laws 1888, § 3199.
aces.
§197.
I 938, Venue § %%.

ct on jurisdiction.—
proceeding for trial,
therein to the court
irefor and filing the
stance the order was
the reason that the
)sts of transfer and
in the action within
se shall be dismissed
ion or proceeding is
ion as if it had been

207.
40, Venue § 90.
raw or modify order
venue, 59 A. L. E . 362.

RE PROVIDERS
of act.
l.

juired of patient—Detch of guarantee, war-

fication of the elements of a malpractice
action based upon failure to obtain informed consent; providing for authority
for the insurance commissioner to require
a joint underwriting a u t h o r i t y ; providing
powers to the insurance commissioner to
examine individual professional liability
claim files and to require separate reporting of financial d a t a relating to profes-

and may be cited
ition of a d damnum
e actions; providing
otice prior to filing
providing for periire damages awarded
i s ; providing for a
teral source rule in
providing for a codi-

sional liability insuiance for health care
providers; and amending section 31-3-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, section 31-5-21,
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d 1953, as amended
by chapter 45, Laws of U t a h 1963, as
amended by chapter 69, L a w s of Utah
1971, and section 78-12-28, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter
212, Laws of U t a h 1971.—L. 1976, ch. 23.

78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.—The
legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care
lias increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims
is increased care cost, both through the health care providers passing the
cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
History:

providers—Insurance
\ authority.

78-14-3

L. 1976, ch. 23, § 2 .

78-14-3, Definition of terms.—As used in this act:
(1) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital, physician,
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental
hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech pathologist, certified social worker, social service worker, social service aide, marriage and family counselor, or practitioner of obstetrics, and others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising
out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons, and officers, em261
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ployees, or agents of any of \,\\Q above acting in the course and scope
their employment.
(2) "Hospital'' means a public or private institution licensed under t
Hospital Licensing Act.
(3) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice medicine and si]
gery as provided in subsection 158-12-3(1).
(4) "Registered nurse" nutans a person licensed to practice profession
nursing as provided in section 58-31-9.
(5) "Licensed practical niirse" means a person licensed to practice
a licensed practical nurse as provided in section 58-31-10.
(6) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to practice nurse-mi
wifery as provided in section 58-13-17 [58-31-17],
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as define
in section 58-7-6.
(8) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental h
giene as defined in section 58-8-|9.
(9) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to, practice optometry
defined in section 58-16-11.
(10) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy
provided in section 58-17-2.
(11) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physic
therapy as provided in section $8-24-6.
(12) "Podiatrist" means a person licensed to practice chiropody as d
fined in section 58-5-12.
>
(13) "Psychologist" mean^ a person licensed to practice psycholog
as defined in section 58-25-4.
(14) "Chiropractic physici|an" means a person licensed to practice cl
ropractic as provided in subsection 58-12-3(3).
(15) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed to practi<
naturopathy as defined in section 58-12-22.
(16) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed to practice o
teopathy as provided in section 58-12-6.
(17) "Osteopathic physiciin and surgeon" means a person licensed 1
practice osteopathy as provided in section 58-12-7.
(18) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice audiology •<
provided in section 58-1-5.
(19) "Speech pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speec
pathology as provided in section 58-1-5.
(20) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice '<
a certified social worker as provided in section 58-35-5.
(21) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice i
a social service worker as provided in section 58-35-5.
(22) "Social service aide'* means a person licensed to practice as
social service aide as provided ih section 58-39-8 [58-35-5].
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(23) "Marriage and family counselor" means a person licensed to practice as a marriage counselor or family counselor as provided in section
58-39-6.
(24) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice
obstetrics in this state as provided in subsection 58-12-3(5).
(25) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care
provider, under a contract, express or implied.
(26) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided
in section 31-2-2.
(27) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact or other legal agent of the patient.
(28) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or
unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means an}'*
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of
warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have
been rendered by the health care provider.
(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical
care, treatment or confinement.
(31) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment,
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 3 .
, . , T ,.
Compiler's Notes.
The bracketed retercnces to section 5831-17 in subd. (6) and section 58-35 5 in
subd. (22) were inserted by the compiler.

Cross-Reference.
Hospital Licensing Act, 26-15-54 et seq.
r
b
H
'

78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions—Application. — (1) No
malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it
is commenced within* two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect'or occurrence, except t h a t :
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discoverinc* misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider lias affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within
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one year after the plaintiff of patient discovers, or through the use of r
sonable diligence, should hive discovered the fraudulent concealme
whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons regardl
of minority or other legal disability and shall apply retroactively to all p
sons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care p
viders and to all malpractice actions against health care providers baj
upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective d
of this act; provided, however, that any action which under former 1
could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may
commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under fom
law; but any action which under former law could have been commem
more than four years after the effective date of this act may be commenc
only within four years after the effective date of this act.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4.
Compiler's Notes.
This act became effective sixty days
after adjournment of the legislature on
J a n u a r y 31, 1976.
Cross-Reference.
Separate trial of s t a t u t e of limitations
issue in malpractice actions, 78-12-47.
Collateral References.
Limitation of Actions<£=>31, 40, 5 5 ( 3 ) ;
Physicians and Surgeons<S= 3 18(l%).
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 74; 54
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 174, 183
et seq.; 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§60.
61 Am. J u r . 2d 307 et seq., Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 181 et seq.
Applicability, in action

against

nurse

in her professional capacity, of stat
of limitations applicable to malpract
8 A. L. R. 3d 1336.
Medical malpractice: amendment ]
porting to change the nature of the act
or theory of recovery, made after stat
of limitations has run, as relating b
to filing of original complaint, 70 A. L
3d 82.
Statute of limitations applicable to r
practice action against physician, surge
dentist, or similar practitioner, 80 A. L
2d 320.
Statute of limitations relating to mi
cal malpractice actions as applicable
actions against unlicensed practitioner,
A. L. R. 3d 114.
"When statute of limitations commer
to run against malpractice action ba
on leaving foreign substance in patie
body, 70 A. L. R. 3d 7.

DECISIONS U N D E R FORMER LAW
Foreign object left in body.
Where foreign object was negligently
left in body of patient during operation
and patient was thus ignorant of r i g h t of
action for malpractice, cause of action did
not accrue until patient learned of presence
of such foreign object. Christiajnsen v.
Rees, 20 U. (2d) 199, 436 P . 2d 435.
Statutory changes.
Although action against physician arose
under 78-12-25 whieh'set a four-yeaf limitation period, the subsequent amendment to
78-12-28 which included physicians and
provided a two-year statute of limitations
shortened the time for asserting the right
of action; plaintiffs had two years Irom the

effective date of the amendment to as
their cause, which they failed to do £
therefore, the cause of action was bar
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P . 2d '
Tolling statute.
Where physician continued to t r e a t
tient after removing her tonsils, repress
ing that her throat condition would cl
up, defense of limitations was not ava
ble to physician in malpractice act
since his repiesentations were in nat
of fraudulent concealment of plaint
cause of action and statute of limitati
did not begin to run until falsity of s
representations was discovered. Petele
Robison, 81 U. 535, 17 P . 2d 244.

78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent—Proof required of pati
-Defenses—Consent to healtb care.—(1) THien a person submits to hea

264

A-29

oceesi

HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE

78-14-5

care rendered by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that what
the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized
to be done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider
in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent,
the patient must prove the following:
(a) That a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient
and health care provider; and
(b) The health care provider rendered health care to the patient; and
(c) The patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health
care rendered; and
(d) The health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and
(e) The patient was not informed of the substantial and significant
risk; and
(f) A reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully informed
as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In determining what
a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do under the
circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided and before the occurrence of any personal
injuries alleged to Have arisen from said health care; and
(g) The unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) I t shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health
care provider based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) The risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered
was relatively minor; or
(b) The risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider was commonly known to the public; or
(c) The patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained
of, that he would accept the health care involved regardless of the risk;
or that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would
be entitled to be informed; or
(d) The health care provider, after considering all of the attendant
facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and
extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably
believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have a substantial
and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or
(e) The patient or his representative executed a written consent which
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved
have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory
manner and that all questions asked about the health care and its attendant
risks have been answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his
265
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representative; such written consent shall be a defense to an action agai
a health care provider based upon failure to obtain informed consent unl
the patient proves that the person giving the consent lacked capacity
consent or shows by clear and convincing proof that the execution of
written consent was induced by the defendant's affirmative acts of frau<
lent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent a
person eighteen years of age or over from refusing to consent to hea
care for his own person upon personal or religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to cons«
to any health care not prohibited by law:
(a) Any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his minor child;
(b) Any married person, for a spouse ;
(c) Any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether f
mally serving or not, for the minor under his care and any guardian
his ward ;
(d) Any person eighteen years of age or over for his or her pan
who is unable by reason of age, physical or mental condition, to prov
such consent;
(e) Any patient eighteen years of age or over;
(f) Any female regardless of age or marital status, when given
connection with her pregnane^* or childbirth;
(g) In the absence of a parent, any adult for his minor brother
sister; and
(h) In the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his minor grai
child.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes health c.
treatment or procedures for another as provided by this act shall be s
ject to civil liability.
History:

I*. 1976, ch. 23, § 5 .

70 C J . S . Physicians and Surgeons §
51 Am. J u r . 2d 223 et seq., Physici
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 105 et

Collateral References.
Physicians and SurgeonsC= 3 15(8), 16.

78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for breach of guarant
warranty, contract or assurance of result.—No liability shall be impoi
upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of gu
antee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be obtained from z
health care rendered unless tjie guarantee, warranty, contract or assurai
is set fortli in writing and signed by the health care provider or an auth
ized agent of the provider.
History:

L. 1976, ch. 23, § 6 .

Collateral References.

Cross-Reference
Cross Reference.
Blood transrusions, procurement and use
of9 blood a service rather than a sale, 26
- *•

Statute of FraudsC=>37, 97.
^ Q J ^ ^ ^
^
p
e ^ SCf ,

a

*

'

Blood transfusion, liability for injuri
death from, 45 A. L. R. 3d 1364.
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78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint.—No dollar amount
shall be specified in the prayer of a complaint filed in a malpractice action
against a health care provider. The complaint shall merely pray for such
damages as are reasonable in the premises.
History:

L. 1976, ch. 23, § 7.

70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 67.
61 Am. J u r . 2d 359 et seq., Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 215 et seq.

CoUateral References.
Physicians and Surgeons<£=*18(ll).

78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action.—No malpractice action
against a health care provider may be commenced unless and until the
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date,
time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of
the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter
or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff and his attorney. Service shall
be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint in a civil action. Such notice shall be served within the time allowed
for commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the
notice is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against
the health care provider shall be extended to ninety days from the date
of service of notice.
H i s t o r y : L. 1976, ch. 23, § 8.
Cross-Reference
uross iteierence.
Service of summons and complaint, Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 4.

CoUateral References.
Physicians and Surgeons<$=>18(2).
p n v s i c i a n s a n d Surgeons § 5 9 .
70 C J S
6 1 A m > j u r > 2"d 306, Physicians, Surgeons,
a I l ( i o t h e r Healers § 180.'

78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for providers—Insurance commissioner may require joint underwriting" authority.—If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of this state any professional liability insurance coverage for health care providers is not
readily available in the voluntary market, and that the public interest
requires, he may by regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide
insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability
policies and individual and group accident and sickness policies providing
medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an
expense incurred basis, including personal injury protection and medical
expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies.
History:

L. 1976, ch. 23, § 9 .

Cross-References.
Commissioner to examine insurer's flics,
etc., 31-3-1.
Governmental entities may purchase liability insurance, (3J-30-2S to* 63-30-34.
^
Insurers' annual statemcuts to contain

separate financial data pertaining to professional liability insurance, 31-5-21.
CoUateral References,
InsuranceC=>ll.l.
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
43 Am. Jur. 2d 108 et seq., Insurance
§ 51 et seq.
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78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act.—The provisions of this act shall apply to nuilprjictice actions against health care
providers which are brought under the Iptah Governmental Immunity Act
in so far as they are applicable; provide^, however, that this act shall in no
way affect the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
H i s t o r y : L. 1976, ch. 23, §10.

Criss-Reference.
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 6330-fl et seq.

78-14-11. Act not retroactive—Exception.—The provisions of this act,
with the exception of the provisions relating to the limitation on the time
for commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries, death or services
rendered which occurred prior to the effective date of this act.
H i s t o r y : L. 1976, ch. 23, § 14.

a p l i c a t i o n of any provision to any person
orr~ circumstance, is held invalid, the rematnder of this act shall not be affected
thereby."

Compiler's Notes.
This act became effective sixty days
after adiournment of the legislature on
J a n u a r y 31, 1976.

Collateral References.
StatutesC=>:261 et seq.
82 C.J.S. Statutes §412 et seq.
73 Am. J u r . 2d 485 et seq., Statutes
§ 3f 7 et seq.

Separability Clause.
Section 15 of Laws 1976, ch. 23, provided: "1£ any provision of this act, or the

CHAPTER 15
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
Section 78-15-1.
78-15-2.
78-15-3.
78-15-4.
78-15-5.
78-15-6.

Short title of act.
Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.
Statute of limitations—Application.
P r a y e r for damages.
Alteration or modification of product after sale as substantial contributing cause—Manufacturer or seller not liable.
Defect or defective condition leaking product unieasonably dangerous
—Rebuttable presumption.

78-15-1. Short title of act.—This act shall be known and mav be cited
as the "Utah Product Liability Act."
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-15-1, enacted by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act enacting sections 78-15-1 through
78-15-G, Utah Code Annotated 1953; relating to product liability; creating a Utah
Product Liability Act; setting forth the
purpose and intent of the act; establishing
a s t a t u t e of limitations for product liability cases; providing for exceptions to
the s t a t u t e ; g r a n t i n g limited immunity to

manufacturers
or sellers of products
against actions based on personal injury,
death or damage to propeity resulting
from the use of products; providing tests
for determining whether or not the product shall be deemed to be defective or
unreasonably dangerous; establishing rebuttable ptesumptions of freedom from
defects; and precluding certain evidence
from admission in civil actions.—L. 1977,
ch. 149.

78-15-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.—(1)
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for
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78-13-6.

Arising without this state in favor of resident.

Option to choose where to bring action.
Where Utah plaintiff sued defendant corporation, which had its principal place of
business in Weber County, Utah, on a transitory cause of action arising without Utah,

78-13-11.

the plaintiff had the option under this seechoose where to bring suit, and where
he chose to brin
g s u i t i n h i s county of residence the
district court had no prerogative to
change venue to Weber County upon defendant's, request. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.
(1983) 660 P 2d 229.
tion to

Duty of clerk — Fees and costs — Effect on jurisdiction.

Cross-References.
Adjustment of costs between counties for
change of venue, 17-15-19.

Fee of clerk on change of venue, 21-2-2.

CHAPTER 14
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Section
78-14-4.
Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
78-14-4.5. Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff
-- No reduction where subrogation right exists — Collateral sources defined
— Procedure to preserve subrogation rights — Evidence admissible — Exceptions.
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action.
78-14-8.
Notice of intent to commence action.
78-14-12. Department of Business Regulation to provide panel — Procedures established by
department — Procedures for requesting panel — Notice — Statute of limitations tolled — Composition of panel — Members to receive per diem and travel
expenses — Department authorized to set license fees of health care providers
to cover costs of administering panel
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights of parties to proceedings — Jurisdiction of panel.
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — No judicial or other review.
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent action — Panelist may not
be compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from civil liability.
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement oi
parties — Compensation to members of panel.
78-14-1.

Short title of act.

Law Reviews.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 495.
78-14-4. S t a t u t e of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No malprac
tice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commencec
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of rea
sonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but nol
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occur
rence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is thai
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shal
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discov
ers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existenc<
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of resident.
aintiff had the option under this secchoose where to bring suit, and where
se to bring suit in his county of resithe district court had no prerogative to
venue to Weber County upon defendequest. Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co.
660 P 2d 229.
Effect on jurisdiction.
>f clerk on change of venue, 21-2-2.

,LTH CARE PROVIDERS
cation.
jllateral sources available to plaintiff
exists — Collateral sources defined
its — Evidence admissible — Exceptalpractice action.
ie panel — Procedures established by
panel — Notice — Statute of limita>mbers to receive per diem and travel
license fees of health care providers
of parties to proceedings — Jurisdici judicial or other review.
bsequent action — Panelist may not
elist from civil liability.
hearing upon written agreement of
id.

— Application. (1) No malpracbrought unless it is commenced
overs, or through the use of rea% whichever first occurs, but not
act, omission, neglect or occurthe health care provider is that
i patient's body, the claim shall
%
the plaintiff or patient discovld have discovered, the existence

of the foreign object wrongfully left in| the patient's body, whichever first occurs;
and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because t h a t health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law;
but any action which under former law Could have been commenced more than four
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years
after the effective date of this act.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 4; 1979, ch. 128,
§1
Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment inserted "under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of law"
near the beginning of subsec. (2); and made
a minor change in punctuation.
Constitutionality.
This section does not violate equal protection of the law requirements of Art. I, § 24
of the state Constitution, and it is not an
unconstitutional "special law" in violation of
Art. I, §26. Allen v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. (1981) 635 P 2d 30.
Provision of this section that statute of
limitations is not tolled because of injured
party's minority does not violate equal protection of laws; does not violate due process
of law; and does not violate open courts provisions of state constitution, art. I, §2.
Hargett v. Limberg (1984) 598 FSupp 152.
Discovery of "injury."
In this section the term discovery of
"injury" means discovery of injury and the
negligence which resulted in the injury; i.e.,
"injury" means legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger
(1979) 601 P 2d 144.

Minors.
Medical malpractice action against a doctor for alleged negligent diagnosis and treatment of a child was barred by this section's
statute of limitations where action was
brought by child's mother individually and as
guardian ad litem for child more than two
years after mother discovered legal injury to
child. Hargett v. Limberg (1984) 598 FSupp
152.
When statute begins to run.
Statute begins to run when an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered a legal injury. Foil v. Ballinger (1979)
601 P 2d 144.
Statute of limitations provided in this section begins to run when plaintiff is aware of
facts that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that he may have a cause of action
against health care provider; a legal determination of negligence is not necessary to start
statute of limitations running. Hargett v.
Limberg (1984) 598 FSupp 152.
Law Reviews.
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1980
Utah L. Rev. 649.

78-14-4.5. Amount of a w a r d reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff — No reduction w h e r e subrogation right exists — Collateral
sources defined — P r o c e d u r e to p r e s e r v e subrogation r i g h t s — Evidence
admissible — E x c e p t i o n s . (1) In all malpractice actions against health care
providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3 (29) in which damages are awarded to
compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amount
of such award by the total of all amounts paid to the plaintiff from all collateral
sources which are available to him; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as provided in this section nor
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shall there be a reduction for any collateral payment not included in the award
of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier
of fact, the court shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts of collateral
sources which have been paid to or for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise
available to him. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which has
been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members
of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which
he is receiving as a result of his injury, and shall offset any reduction in the award
by such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no reduction made with respect
to future collateral source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4).
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means payments made to
or for the benefit of the plaintiff for:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable under the United States
Social Security Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, or any other
public program, except the federal programs which are required by law to seek
subrogation;
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile accident
insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any
other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group, organization, partnership,
or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions,
or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers
or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 days
before settlement or trial of the action a written notice upon each health care
provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice
shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral sources, the amount
of collateral sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons who received payment, and the items and purposes for which payment has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that provide payments or
benefits available in the future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent
available irrespective of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the likelihood
or unlikelihood that such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the
future is also admissible. The trier of fact may consider such evidence in determining the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover the amounts of such
benefits from a health care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or entity
as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26, except to the extent
that subrogation rights to amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of insurance providing benefits
affected by this section are construed in accordance with this section.
History: C. 1953, TS-14-4.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 237, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to health care malpractice
actions; prohibiting compensation to plaintiff
for costs or expenses that were paid from a
collateral source in the absence of subrogation rights; requiring notice of subrogation

rights; and providing an effective date. —
Laws 1985, ch 237.
Enacts: 78-14-4.5.
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laus 19S5, ch. 237 provided:
"This act takes effect on July 1, 1985."
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78-14-5.

Failure to obtain informed consent, etc.

Cross-References.
Abortion, informed consent requirements^
76-7-305, 76-7-305 5.
Blood donation by minor over eighteen],
parental consent not required, 15-2-5.
Sterilization, informed consent for proce^
dure, 64-10-1.
Venereal disease, minor's power to consent
to treatment, 26-6-18.

power to submit to surgical procedures upon
herself; husband's consent to such medical
procedures are not required. Reiser v. Lohner
(1982) 641 P 2d 93.
Law Reviews.
California Supreme Court Expands the
Informed Consent Doctrine; Physicians Have
a Duty to Obtain an Informed Refusal:
Truman v. Thomas, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 933.

Pregnancy and childbirth.
Where married pregnant woman is in fu|l
possession of her faculties, she alone has th^
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in malpractice action.
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider as defined in Section
78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a client seeking damages in connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful death
caused by the negligence of another which exceeds 33-!/3% of the amount recovered.
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement,
arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal is involved.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-7.5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 67, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to health care malpractice;
providing limitations on amounts of contingent fees an attorney mav collect in malpractice action; and providing an effective dat^.
- Laws 1985, ch. 67.

Enacts: 78-14-7.5.
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1985, ch. 67 provided:
"This act takes effect on July 1,1985."

78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action
against a health care provider. If the I notice is served less than ninety days prior
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall
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not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care
provider.
History:
§2.

L. 1976, ch. 23, § 8; 1979, ch. 128,

filed a notice of intent under this section on
August 17, 1978, but did not file the action
until January 18, 1979, the action was properly dismissed since the action had to be filed
within 120 days of the filing of the notice of
intent (December 15, 1978). Millett v. Clark
Clinic Corp. (1980) 609 P 2d 934.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1979 amendment, in the first paragraph, s u b s t i t u t e d " i n i t i a t e d " for "commenced" in the first sentence; inserted "a
general statement o f after "shall include" in
the second sentence; s u b s t i t u t e d "or his
attorney" for "and his attorney" in the third
sentence; added "or by certified mail * * *
date of mailing" to the fourth sentence; substituted "120 days" for "ninety days" in the
last sentence; and added the second paragraph.
Constitutionality.
The 1979 amendment of this section did
not violate constitutional requirement that
acts embrace no more than one subject; title
of a bill need not describe each and every
change contained in the bill, and the title of
an act amending a previous act is sufficient
if it simply specifies t h e section to be
amended. McGuire v. University of Utah
Medical Center (1979) 603 P 2d 786.
The 1979 amendment of this section is not
unconstitutional as being a special law; the
amendment clearly operates uniformly upon
a class of persons consisting of all those having a cause of action arising prior to the
effective date of the Health Care Malpractice
Act whether they have been filed or not.
McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center (1979) 603 P 2d 786.
This section does not constitute unconstitutional special legislation. Yates v. Vernal
Family Health Center (1980) 617 P 2d 352.
This section does not violate Art. I, § 24 or
Art. I, § 26 of the state Constitution. Allen v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (1981) 635 P
2d 30.
Action not timely filed.
Where plaintiff experienced complications
from breast surgery necessitating a second
operation on November 2, 1976, and then

Applicability.
The 90-day period following the giving of
notice under this section is not a statutory
prohibition under § 78-12-41 so as to toil the
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s during the 90-day
period since the specific provision of this section controls t h e g e n e r a l provision of
78-12-41. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp. (1980)
609 P 2d 934.
F a i l u r e to comply.
The notice provisions of this section were
not complied with where plaintiff's husband,
rather than plaintiff herself, filed the notice;
however, such failure to comply was not an
adjudication on the merits, but merely a procedural defect that did not relate to the merits of the basic action, and plaintiff was
entitled to serve a proper notice and file
another complaint pursuant to the requirements of 78-12-40. Yates v. Vernal Family
Health Center (1980) 617 P 2d 352.
Notice.
Filing of the complaint did not satisfy the
notice requirement as this section required
notice be given ninety days before filing.
Vealey v. Clegg (1978) 579 P 2d 919, decided
prior to 1979 amendment.
Retroactive effect of a m e n d m e n t .
The 1979 amendment of this section was
retroactive; the notice of intent to sue provision is not applicable to causes of action aris
ing before enactment of the Malpractice Act
(April 1, 1976) and does not determine wher
an action is "commenced." Foil v. Ballinge]
(1979) 601 P 2d 144; McGuire v. University o
Utah Medical Center (1979) 603 P 2d 786.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Application.
Notice requirements applied to causes of
actions arising before and filed after the
effective date of this section. Vealey v. Clegg
(1978) 579 P 2d 919, decided prior to 1979
amendment.

When action is commenced.
Filing of complaint without the notic
required by this section prior to its amend
ment in 1979 was sufficient to commence th
action, since dismissal (due to absence o
notice) was without prejudice and thus nc
an adjudication on the m e r i t s . Foil >
Ballinger (1979) 601 P 2d 144.
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78-14-12. Department of Business R e g u l a t i o n to provide panel — Procedures established by department — Procedures for requesting panel — Notice
— Statute of limitations toiled — Composition of panel — Members to receive
per diem and travel expenses — Department authorized to set license fees of
health care providers to cover costs of administering panel. (1) The Department
of Business Regulation shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice
cases against health care providers as defined in Section 78-14-3 filed after July
1, 1985. The department shall establish procedures for prelitigation consideration
of personal injury and wrongful death claims for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care. The proceedings are informal and
nonbinding, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation.
Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged,
and immune from civil process.
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the Department of Business Regulation within 60
days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8. The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice
and request.
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this section tolls
the applicable statute of limitations for a period of 60 days following the issuance
of an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion shall be sent to all parties
by certified mail, return receipt requested.
(4) The department provides for and appoints an appropriate panel or panels
to accept and hear complaints of negligence and damages, made by or on behalf
of any patient who is an alleged victim of negligence. The panels are composed
of:
(a) one member appointed from a list provided by the commissioners of the
Utah State Bar, who is a resident lawyer currently licensed to practice law in this
state who shall serve as chairman of the panel;
(b) one member who is licensed under Section 78-14-3, who is practicing in the
same specialty as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list provided by the
professional association representing the same area of practice as the health care
provider; or in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who
is an individual currently serving in hospital administration and appointed from
a list submitted by the Utah Hospital Association; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital employee, or other health
care provider, and who is a responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed
by a unanimous decision of the members comprising the panel.
(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify, under oath, that he
or she is without bias or conflict of interest with respect to any matter under consideration.
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of
the Department of Business Regulation.
(7) In addition to the actual cost of administering the licensure of health care
providers, the Division of Registration of the Department of Business Regulation
is authorized to set license fees of health care providers within the limits established by law equal to their proportionate costs of administering prelitigation panels. None of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel shall be borne by
the claimant, except as provided under Section 78-14-16.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-12, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 1.

Title of Act.
An act relating to health care malpractice
actions; establishing a prelitigation panel
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appointed by the Department of Business
Regulation for prelitigation consideration of
personal injury and wrongful death claims;
establishing procedures; and providing an
effective date. — Laws 1985, ch. 238.

Enacts: 78-14-12, 78-14-13, 78-14-14,
78-14-15, 78-14-16.
Effective Date.
Section
Section66ofofI Laws 1985, ch. 238 provided:
"This act takes effect on July 1,1985."

78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights of parties to proceedings — Jurisdiction of panel. (1) No record of the proceedings is required
and all evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or witnesses
who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings.
The hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas and to administer oaths,
and any expenses incurred by the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and mileage. The proceedings are
informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or
perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of th(
panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with counsel, and participate ii
the proceedings, except upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreemen
of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to the public. No part
shall have the right to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary formalitie
of civil trials and court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however, reques
special or supplemental participation of some or all parties in particular respect!
Communications between the panel and the parties, except the testimony of th
parties on the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to all other parties.
(3) The Department of Business Regulation shall appoint a panel to considc
the claim and set the matter for panel review immediately upon receipt of
request. A panel retains jurisdiction of any claim for 90 days from the date of filir
the request. The jurisdiction of the panel may be extended and the proceeding m;
continue for 30-day periods upon written agreement of all parties and the membe
of the panel.
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings before a panel.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-13, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 2.
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel — No judicial or oth
review. The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than 30 days af
the end of the proceedings. The panel shall determine on the basis of the evidei
whether each claim against each health care provider has merit or has no me
and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in harm to
claimant
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's decision or rec(
mendations.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-14, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 238, § 3.
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subsequent actioi
Panelist may not be compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from <
liability. Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel
its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evid
in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent juri (
tion. No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently
with regard to the subject matter of the panel's review. A panelist has immt
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from civil liability arising from participation as a panelist and for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course and scope of duties
prescribed by this section.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-15, enacted by |L.
1985, ch. 238, § 4.
78-14-lG. Proceedings considered a binding a r b i t r a t i o n hearing upon written a g r e e m e n t of parties — Compensation to members of panel. Upon written
agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a binding arbitration
hearing and proceed under Chapter 31, Title 78, except for the selection of the
panel, which is done as set forth in Section 78-14-12 (4). If the proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the parties are equally responsible for compensation to the members of the panel for services rendered.
History: C. 1953, 78-14-16, enacted by | L.
1985, ch. 238. § 5.

CHAPTER 15
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
78-15-1.

S h o r t title of act.

Law Reviews.
The Utah Product Liability Limitation of
Action: An Unfair Resolution of Competing
Concerns, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 149.
Strict Products Liability in Utah Following
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel to.,
1980 Utah L. Rev. 577.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entelred
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 495, 496.

78-15-4.

P r a y e r for damages.

Defense of misuse — comparative principles in determining liability.
Where the defense of misuse was present
in a products liability case, Supreme Court
applied comparative principles to adopt the
rule that the defense of misuse in a products
78-15-5.

Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. 3.
The Merger of Comparative Fault Principles with Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964.
Used Products and Strict Liability: A Practical Approach to a Complex Problem, 1981
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 154.
Mulherin v. Ingersolk Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461.

liability case, where both defect in the
product and misuse contribute to cause the
damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's
recovery to that portion of his damages equal
to the percentage of the cause contributed by
the product defect. Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co. (1981) 628 P 2d 1301.

Alteration or modification of p r o d u c t , etc.

Applicability.
This section did not apply where there was
no alteration or modification of the product
which changed its purpose or use from that
for which it was designed. Mulherin v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. (19S1) 628 P 2d 1301.

This section requires some sort of physical
alteration or modification of the product
itself which leaves the product in a different
condition or form than it was in when it left
the manufacturer's or seller's hands.
Beacham v. Lee-Norse (1983) 714 F 2d 1010.
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